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A CRITICAL STUDY OF AMERICAN RECOGNITION  
POLICY TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA 1917 - 1923

MARVIN G. ALEXANDER

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A CRITICAL STUDY OF AMERICAN RECOGNITION  
POLICY TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA 1917-1923

by

Marvin G. Alexander

Thesis  
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A CRITICAL STUDY OF AMERICAN RECOGNITION  
POLICY TOWARD SOVIET RUSSIA 1917-1923

by

LCDR Marvin G. Alexander, USN

Submitted to the  
Faculty of the School of International Service  
of The American University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree  
of  
MASTER OF ARTS



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AN ABSTRACT

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September, 1965

The American University  
Washington, D. C.

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THESIS

by

A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF

STRESS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF

by

JOHN W. HARRIS

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of Naval Postgraduate Studies

of the Naval Postgraduate School

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree

of

MASTERS OF ARTS

Submitted, 1966

The Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California

## ABSTRACT

This is a study of the recognition policy of the United States toward Soviet Russia in the years immediately following the October Revolution of 1917. The traditional roots of American recognitional policy and their application to the problem of Soviet Russia are emphasized.

It is shown that American policy was characterized by what George Kennan has called a "legalistic-moralistic" approach. This led to a virtual deadlock by 1923 of diplomatic relations--an impasse which continued until Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in 1933.

The conclusion is drawn that this policy of non-recognition was a result of the economic, political, and social pressures which shape American political thinking during the period. It was, in addition, an unproductive policy which failed to seek out and to exploit the potential of realistic diplomacy.



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE PROBLEM . . . . .	1
II. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION POLICY TO 1917 . . .	6
III. WILSON AND RECOGNITION . . . . .	19
IV. HUGHES AND RECOGNITION . . . . .	34
V. THE DOMESTIC SCENE . . . . .	53
VI. THE DEBT QUESTION . . . . .	73
VII. TRADE AND RECOGNITION . . . . .	89
VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . .	102
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	119

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page	Chapter
i	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . I
ii	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . II
iii	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . III
iv	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . IV
v	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . V
vi	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . VI
vii	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . VII
viii	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . VIII
ix	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . IX
x	THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD . . . . . X

## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

At the beginning of the year 1933, only the United States of all the Great Powers of the world still stood out against maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On November 7, 1933, M. Litvinov arrived in the United States from Russia to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations. The negotiations continued until November 16, at which time the points on which agreement had been reached were set forth in a number of communications between President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Litvinov. The long drought was over--or such was the hope.

Now sixteen years is a short time as the events of history are measured. It is, however, a relatively long time for one Great Power to refuse formally to recognize another. In stating the fundamental reason for the American policy of nonrecognition, Samuel F. Bemis termed it "the irreconcilability of the revolutionary communist theory and practice of government with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism."<sup>1</sup>

A study of the volume of the diplomatic correspondence between the United States and the Soviet Union for the

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (London: Jonathan F. Cape, 1937), pp. 728-729.

At the beginning of the year 1911, with the return of all the German forces of the world will stand up against maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On November 1, 1911, Dr. Zimmermann arrived in the United States from Berlin to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations. The negotiations continued until November 18, at which time the points on which agreement had been reached were set forth in a signed communication between President Roosevelt and Foreign Minister Zimmermann.

The very language was used—on this and the next.

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policy of nonrecognition, Zimmermann's words are: "It was

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relations of government with the Soviet and practice of

American democracy and civilization."

A study of the course of the diplomatic controversy

will show that the United States and the Soviet Union have

<sup>1</sup> Zimmermann, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1911), pp. 12-13.



years from 1917 to 1933, as contained in the United States Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, reveals a striking fact. The years from 1917 through 1923 are marked by a fairly heavy volume of correspondence. The years of 1924 through 1932 are characterized by a slender volume of diplomatic correspondence, which does pick up again in 1933 to a more normal level.

What had happened was that by 1923 the official stand of the United States toward recognition of the Soviet Union had become so hardened that any official attempts to open the topic from any quarter were effectively squelched. There existed from 1923 to 1933 a form of diplomatic "dead time" between the two nations which was finally broken by the overtures of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Soviets.

The approach in this paper will be to make a critical study of the recognition policy of the United States toward Soviet Russia from the years 1917 through 1923. This time period has been chosen on the basis that it constitutes an effective entity in itself of the Soviet recognition problem.

The past recognition policies of the United States will be briefly examined in order to form a background against which to examine the recognition policies of the Democratic Administration of President Woodrow Wilson and

years from 1971 to 1973, as contained in the United States Department of State record relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 1, 1971-1973. The years from 1971 through 1973 are covered by a fairly heavy volume of correspondence. The years of 1974 through 1975 are characterized by a number of significant developments. Some other brief of space is left to a more general review.

What has happened was said by 1975 the political stand of the United States toward recognition of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China. The People's Republic of China was established in 1949. There is no doubt that it is a fact of significant importance. Between the two nations there has been a long and difficult relationship. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations.

The question is how far will we go with a unilateral study of the development of the United States toward the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations. The People's Republic of China is a member of the United Nations.

the Republican Administrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge. The successive Presidential Administrations will be compared and contrasted as to Soviet recognition policy. Related issues as the debt question, trade, and domestic pressures will be examined in some detail.

A salient feature of any study of the diplomatic history of the United States in the period following World War I is that this was an era in which there existed for the United States what could be called an option of participation as a Great Power in the events of the world. Great Britain and France felt impelled to establish relations with Russia by the mid-twenties. The United States was under no such compulsion. It was able to indulge in its whims almost at will. The future day of reckoning was not yet in sight. In his book, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, George Kennan makes two observations which aid in the understanding of this very interesting period of American political thinking:

. . . it is clear that there has been in the past a very significant gap between challenge and response in our conduct of foreign policy; that this gap still exists; and that, whereas fifty years ago it was not very dangerous to us, today (1951) it puts us in grave peril.<sup>2</sup>

The second observation is as follows:

As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious fault of our past policy formation to be in something

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<sup>2</sup>George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 81.



The Commission's deliberations on the proposed Working Party  
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that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy.

. . . . .

It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of government in the international field by the acceptance of some system of rules and restraints.<sup>3</sup>

Kennan's observations are pertinent because the period from 1917 to 1933 was a period in which our foreign policy lagged. The years of the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson were certainly moralistic and those of his Republican successor certainly legalistic. The combined term "legalistic-moralistic," moreover, has a very real application in that the policies of Republicans and Democrats alike combined features of both. It was a matter of degree.

Finally, the conclusions of this author will fall into two areas. First will be a summation of recognitional principles and recognitional policy as they applied to the time period studied. Second, the validity of the American policy of nonrecognition will be considered. Should the United States have recognized the Soviet Union at an earlier time, or was there really no sounder approach than was applied?

The chief sources of data have been the files of the

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 83.



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Department of State section of the National Archives which pertain to Russia and the Department of State Series Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. In addition, past issues of The New York Times for the early recognition period have been consulted where possible. Secondary sources have been employed as necessary to fill in accounts, but the approach has been to utilize primary source material to the fullest possible extent as a basis for conclusions.

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## CHAPTER II

### UNITED STATES RECOGNITION POLICY TO 1917

The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief sketch of the recognition policies of the United States up to the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in November of 1917. There has been in American diplomacy a mainstream of recognition policy since the days of Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State. From this main channel, American statesmen (such as, Seward, Wilson, and Hughes) have occasionally strayed, but the ultimate result has always been a return to the main channel, which is termed de facto recognition.

John Bassett Moore has defined recognition as "the assurance given to a new state that it will be permitted to hold its place and rank, in the character of an independent political organism, in the society of nations."<sup>1</sup> Recognition is important because, although "the rights and attributes of sovereignty belong to it independently of all recognition, . . . it is only after it has been recognized that it is assured exercising them."<sup>2</sup>

Recognition has traditionally taken two forms--de

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<sup>1</sup>John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (New York: Government Printing Office, 1906), I, 72.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.





jure and de facto. The act of recognition itself is not de jure or de facto, but "the state or government, as the case may be" is so recognized.<sup>3</sup> De jure recognition in its original form connotated that a state had acquired power by legal measures and thus was assured of legitimacy. De facto recognition has meant the fact of effective control of the state. If the new government could carry out its international obligations, it should be recognized de facto.<sup>4</sup> The terms have come to indicate more a matter of degree—with de facto recognition being of a provisional nature. Thus, for example, Great Britain refused to recognize Russia from 1917 to 1921. In 1921, she recognized the Russian government de facto and in 1924 de jure. Then, in 1927, Great Britain broke off relations with Soviet Russia but did not withdraw recognition.<sup>5</sup>

The concept of recognition as it developed in the United States was the handiwork of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson's concepts of popular sovereignty and the right of revolution caused him to "break with the legitimist theorists

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<sup>3</sup>J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 147.

<sup>4</sup>Julius Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1915), Vol. LXVI, No. 1, p. 66.

<sup>5</sup>Brierly, op. cit., pp. 147-148.





of the eighteenth century."<sup>6</sup> In The Declaration of Independence, Jefferson wrote that:

. . . whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government.<sup>7</sup>

From this position, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, evolved the two principles which have been essential to United States recognition ever since--de facto control and popular approval. In December, 1792, in a statement of principle on American attitude toward changes in French government, he wrote to Mr. Pinckney in London:

We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under what forms it pleases and to change these forms at its own will; and externally to transact business with other nations through whatever organ it chooses whether that be a King, Convention, Committee, President or whatever it may be. The only thing essential is the will of the nation.<sup>8</sup>

The traditional policy of the United States has been termed a de facto one and, indeed, at times, has moved close to the technical meaning of de facto as connotating merely effective control of the state--by whatever means. It is

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<sup>6</sup>Goebel, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>7</sup>The Declaration of Independence (excerpt), cited by Robert M. Langdon and Walter Norris, American Foreign Policy (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1961), p. 78.

<sup>8</sup>Paul Leicester Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York and London, 1905), V, 253.

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often overlooked that for Jefferson mere de facto control by the new government was not sufficient. Jefferson also insisted upon popular will being expressed. On November 7, 1792, before he wrote to Pinckney, Jefferson had written to Gouverneur Morris in Paris to advise him on the French situation caused by the deposing of the French king:

With what kind of government you do business is another question. It accords with our principles to acknolege [sic] any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared. The late government was of this kind and was accordingly acknoleged [sic] by all branches of ours. So any alteration of it which shall be made by the will of the nation substantially declared, will doubtless be acknoleged [sic] in like manner. With such a government every kind of business may be done. But there are some matters which I conceive might be transacted with a government de facto; such, for instance, as the reforming the unfriendly restriction on our commerce and navigation. Such cases you will readily distinguish when they occur.<sup>9</sup>

Taylor Cole, in a study of American recognition policy, stresses that American policy from the time of Jefferson has been guided by two criteria, "first, the present and future stability of the government to be recognized and, second, the willingness and ability of the government to fulfill its international obligations."<sup>10</sup> Cole's statement is not inconsistent with Jefferson's policy.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, VI, 131.

<sup>10</sup> Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1928), pp. 19-20.



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Colin's statement is not inconsistent with Jefferson's belief  
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Jefferson did take de facto control into account but, primarily, he considered stability as "the determining factor" in determining recognition. The will of the nation was paramount because all rightful authority found its source in the people and stability "from a practical viewpoint could only be found where the people sanctioned the new government."<sup>11</sup>

A view such as Jefferson's could be easily perverted. It was easy to equate the will of the people with simple control and thus de facto control. As early as 1793, Citizen Genêt was recognized by the United States as the French Minister of the new French Republic. There was no investigation into the nature of the new republic other than the fact of its effective control of France.<sup>12</sup> The same policy was followed in extending recognition to the new states of Latin America, although there was some delay because of involvement with Spain over Florida. Henry Clay pressed for early recognition and summed up the United States position:

We have constantly proceeded on the principle that the government de facto is that we can alone notice. Whatever form of government any society of people adopts, whoever they acknowledge as their sovereign, we consider that government, or that sovereignty as

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>12</sup>Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 267.





the one to be acknowledged by us. We have invariably abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of the sovereign de jure and against the sovereign de facto. That is a question for the nation in which it arises to determine. And so far as we are concerned, the sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure. . . . As soon as stability and order are maintained, no matter by whom, we have always considered and ought to consider the actual as the true government.<sup>13</sup>

In the space of time up to the Civil War, the de facto approach was so consistently followed that it assumed the character of tradition in American foreign policy. During the period the United States recognized "new governments when they in fact come into existence and when they promised to be firm and stable."<sup>14</sup> Goebel asserts, "it forms one of the distinctive contributions of United States diplomacy to the present international system."<sup>15</sup>

The advent of the Civil War brought new problems to the United States. Secretary of State Seward wished to prevent the recognition of the Confederacy abroad and to deter European intervention in Latin America. He could not deny the right of revolution as one of the founding principles of the United States. Seward's answer was to stress the element of the approval of the people to the change. As

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<sup>13</sup>Mallory, Life and Speeches of Henry Clay, I, 391, cited by Julius Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1915), p. 123.

<sup>14</sup>Cole, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>15</sup>Goebel, op. cit., p. 221.





we have seen, such approval had, more often than not, been inferred in determining recognition.<sup>16</sup> Seward stressed that a revolutionary government in a republican state would not be recognized by the United States if it secured control by force of arms in defiance of the existing constitution and against the will of the people. A change of regime by force must obtain the formal acquiescence and acceptance of the people.<sup>17</sup>

It can be readily seen that Seward's insistence that the will of the people be declared was a marked departure from the previously used de facto principle. This insistence upon more than mere existence of a government as a criterion of recognition lasted for some twenty-five years during which it was customary to insist that a revolutionary government demonstrate proof of popular support by an act of "election or an act of the legislature" before recognition would be extended by the United States.<sup>18</sup> Although there was then a swing back to de facto recognition, the policy of Seward had foreshadowed the policies of Woodrow Wilson.

By the 1890's, the transition back to the earlier de

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<sup>16</sup>Cole, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>17</sup>Julius W. Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 174.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

we have seen, even approval has, more often than not, been  
 intended in the sense of "approval,"<sup>15</sup> which implies that  
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 be recognized by the United States if it were not of the  
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 against the will of the people. A change of regime by force  
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It can be readily seen that the United States has  
 this will on the basis of which it has decided to withhold  
 from the revolutionaries and to recognize the United States.  
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<sup>15</sup> "The United States has a long history of recognizing  
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<sup>16</sup> "The United States has a long history of recognizing  
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 (The United States has a long history of recognizing  
 governments which are the result of a revolution.)

facto recognition policy was generally complete.<sup>19</sup> With the turn of the century, a new element cropped up in American recognition policy. This was an insistence that nations live up to their international obligations. That this new insistence was concomitant with expansion of American interests into foreign lands was no coincidence.<sup>20</sup> Thus, during the Administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, conditions of recognition were broadened to include "national self-interest and the protection of commercial agreements made by the former governments with American business."<sup>21</sup> Frequently, recognition was used to force concessions. The forcing of the Platt Amendment upon Cuba in 1902 and the recognition of Panama in 1903 were examples in point.

Thus, the first change in the early nineteenth century recognition policy to America was the addition to previous de facto requirements of the willingness to meet international responsibilities. It was perhaps inevitable in view of increasing American investments abroad that the new emphasis should be colored by American self-interest of a material nature. The concern for republican institutions was still present, however, and it was to receive public

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<sup>19</sup>Goebel, op. cit., p. 209.      <sup>20</sup>Cole, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>21</sup>Robert M. Langdon and Walter Norris, American Foreign Policy (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1961), p. 80.





attention from 1913 to 1921 during the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson.

The years during which Woodrow Wilson was President were years of vigorous activity in the field of American recognition both in action and in principle. It has been generally agreed by historians and others that the years 1913 to 1921 mark a new era in "the acknowledgment of new governments and new states."<sup>22</sup>

The immediate problem of recognition facing President Wilson was that of the Huerta regime in Mexico. The history of the case, briefly, was that the dictator-president of Mexico, Porfirio Díaz, had been overthrown in 1911 in a revolution led by Francisco I. Madero. Madero succeeded to power for sixteen months and, in turn, was overthrown by an army revolt at Mexico City. The man to whom Madero had trusted his defense was one General Victoriano Huerta. After betraying Madero, Huerta arrested him, forced him to resign, and then had him shot in a staged escape attempt.<sup>23</sup>

President Taft had taken no steps toward recognition in the last few days of his term, possibly because the Department of State hoped to gain "settlement of certain disputes as the price of recognition." The new President,

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<sup>22</sup>Cole, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>23</sup>Pratt, op. cit., p. 426.

Open for 3 months, the museum will be open from 10:00 AM to 5:00 PM, 7 days a week.

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Thereby, the following can be concluded:

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Woodrow Wilson, had been shocked by the assassination of Madero and refused to deal with Huerta.<sup>24</sup> Soon after coming to office, Wilson had stated on March 11, 1913:

Co-operation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processed just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican governments everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves.<sup>25</sup>

Wilson's view of Huerta was that, while he was in de facto control of the Mexican government, he had come to office through assassination. His rule was based on force and violence rather than the will of the people. Recognition of Huerta would, therefore, have to await certain imposed conditions: these were--

Cession of all civil warfare, assurance of a free election, Huerta's promise not to be a candidate, and Huerta's agreement to abide by results of the election and similar agreements from all other factions.<sup>26</sup>

The political warfare between Wilson and Huerta finally broke into armed hostility when the United States

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 427.

<sup>25</sup> Edgar E. Robinson and Victor West, The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917), pp. 179-180.

<sup>26</sup> Langdon and Norris, op. cit., p. 81.







occupied Vera Cruz on April 22, 1914, following provocative acts by Huerta. President Wilson accepted the good offices of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to mediate the dispute, but the conference of mediation which met at Niagara Falls in May could not come to a satisfactory decision. Huerta, however, resigned on July 15, 1914, and fled to Europe. More than a year later, on October 19, 1915, the Government of Venustiano Carranza was given de facto recognition.<sup>27</sup>

Woodrow Wilson's ideas on recognition as seen in the Huerta case differed from those of the traditional de facto school and also from those of Roosevelt and Taft who had immediately preceded him. Wilson was not opposed to revolutionary change in government, but he would not accept de facto control as alone being indicative of public will. For Wilson, the methods by which the new government came to power were important--whether by civilized or by barbaric methods. His policy harked back to that of Seward's but went even further in requiring that a regime hold the confidence of the people.

Contrary to the attitudes of Roosevelt and Taft, Wilson was willing to sacrifice material gain for principle. He refused to use recognition to further the financial interests of individuals.<sup>28</sup> This was evident in a statement

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<sup>27</sup>Cole, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 53.



of September 2, 1916:

So long as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence. No permanency can be given the affairs of any republic by a title based upon intrigue and assassination. I declared that to be the policy of this Administration within three weeks after I assumed the presidency. I here again avow it. I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any property rights whatever.<sup>29</sup>

Although President Wilson's stand against Huerta aroused much Latin-American antipathy, there was a good deal of Latin-American support for Wilson's "constitutional" approach in which he insisted that new governments acquire power within the existing constitutional framework.<sup>30</sup> In 1907, five Central American republics had incorporated in a treaty, the so-called Tobar Doctrine that recognition be withheld from revolting governments. While the United States never entered into any specific agreements on the Tobar Doctrine, it did support the plan. This led, interestingly enough, to a meeting in Washington--from December, 1922, to February, 1923, in which a general treaty of peace and amity was drawn by the five Central American republics.

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<sup>29</sup> James Brown Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Messages, Addresses, Papers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 231-232.

<sup>30</sup> William L. Neuman, Jr., Recognition of Governments in the Americas (Washington: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1947), p. 13.





Although the meeting took place under American auspices, the United States did not become a member of the pact. It did support the rather elaborate set of principles set forth in the treaty to militate against illegal and forceful overthrow of government by coup d'état and revolution.<sup>31</sup>

While the recounting of this history of the Tobar Doctrine gets ahead of the author's account, which will pick up in the next chapter with Wilson's recognition problem over the Soviet Union, it does indicate that, even with the differing courses taken by various administrations on the subject of recognition, there were continuing policies which gave continuity from administration to administration.

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<sup>31</sup>Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (fifth edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 325.





## CHAPTER III

### WILSON AND RECOGNITION

The great influence abroad of Woodrow Wilson, during and following World War I, was a result of increasing respect paid by the world to the position of the United States as a Great Power and of the impact of the principles to which Wilson was dedicated. Unfortunately, the people of the United States lagged behind the world in their perception and appreciation of these facts.

Despite his perturbation over Russian conditions, Wilson moved quickly to recognize the new Provisional Government when Tsarism collapsed in March, 1917, and was replaced by a government dedicated to the introduction of Western political freedom and to the continuation of the war against Germany. The communication of United States Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, caught some of the emotional impact of the situation.

1107. The six days between last Sunday and this have witnessed the most amazing revolution. . . . I request respectfully that you promptly give me authority to recognize Provisional Government as first recognition is desirable from every viewpoint.<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of State Lansing cabled United States recognition of the new government on March 20, 1917. On July 15,

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<sup>1</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States - 1917 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), III, 1207.



1917, Professor Boris A. Bakhmetev was received by the United States as the accredited representative of Russia.<sup>2</sup> Soon credits were extended to the new government--something which had not been the case with the government of the Tsar.

The overthrow by the Bolsheviks of the Provisional Government on November 7, 1917, thus was a most unhappy culmination of events. By their betrayal of budding Russian democracy and subsequent actions in removing Russia from the war effort, as well as preaching a doctrine of world revolution and repudiating past debts and alliances, the Bolsheviks soon became an anathema to the United States and to the Allies in general.

Some two weeks after the Bolsheviks' success, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky sent a communication to the diplomatic corps in Petrograd, announcing the formation of the Soviet Government and requesting its recognition. The American Ambassador, David R. Francis, chose to ignore the message at that time. His lack of reaction unofficially made the beginning of a sixteen-year interruption in the diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>National Archives. Department of State - 861.01 Series. Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929.

<sup>3</sup>Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 3.

1917, Professor David A. Robinson was received by the United States as the American representative of Russia. Robinson was welcomed to the new government—immediately after the war—and the government of the United States had not been the same since the government of the United States by the President of the Republic.

1. The American Ambassador, Mr. H. V. Knox, has been informed that the Soviet Government has requested the American Government to send a commission to the diplomatic corps in Leningrad, to investigate the situation of the Soviet Government and to report its findings.



Official relations were not reinstituted until November 16, 1933.

It soon became evident that the Allies were divided on any common positive policy toward Russia. The French and Italians were against any liberalization of war aims. The British and Americans were initially against military intervention. The only common policy was one of nonrecognition of the Bolsheviks. Kennan speaks of this action as "characteristic of coalition diplomacy" in which it is as a rule possible to agree "only on what not to do."<sup>4</sup>

Despite the mutual antipathy which existed between Wilson and Lansing, they agreed upon a course of nonrecognition toward the Bolsheviks. There is little doubt that the initial policy of the United States was based upon the hope of the repudiation of the Bolsheviks by the Russian people. At the least, it was hoped that the Bolsheviks would be forced by the people to continue the war against Germany.<sup>5</sup> There was also a general belief that recognition of the Bolsheviks would hinder the rise to power of some other government which would be more willing to prosecute the war.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (New York: The New American Library, 1962), p. 48.

<sup>5</sup>Browder, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>6</sup>Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 115.



Official statement was a long memorandum dated December 15, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

It soon became obvious that the Allies were divided on any common positive policy toward Russia. The French and Italians were against any identification of our aims. The British and Americans were insisting against military intervention. The only common policy was one of nonrecognition of the satellites. Russian agents in this service at "control" of our activities in which it is a safe possibility to expect "only" on what not to do.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the mutual hostility which existed between Britain and Germany, they agreed upon a course of nonrecognition toward the satellites. There is little doubt that the initial policy of the British states was based upon the hope of the continuation of the satellites by the British policy. At the least, it was hoped that the satellites would be forced by the people to continue the war against Germany.<sup>3</sup>

There was also a general belief that cooperation of the satellites would result and that the power of such states government would result in some ability to pressure the

<sup>1</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (New York: The New American Library, 1947), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Broderick, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Robert Ross, The Road to Russia (New York: Random House, 1944), p. 12.

The Wilson-Lansing relationship was one of the interesting features of the half decade preceding 1920. The two men were almost exactly opposite "in temperament and mental process. Lansing was practical, skeptical, and keenly analytical; Wilson was idealistic, moralistic, and intuitive."<sup>7</sup> Although Lansing was well liked and appreciated by fellow diplomats and statesmen, President Wilson obviously held Lansing in no particular esteem. It was a tribute to Lansing's value to the President that the relationship lasted so long--from Lansing's interim appointment as Secretary of State on June 9, 1915, to relieve William Jennings Bryan to his summary discharge on February 13, 1920, by an ailing Wilson. The stature of Lansing has grown with the passage of time, and he has come to be recognized as "one of the ablest and most experienced American Secretaries of State." It must have been considerably galling to the reserved Lansing to have been continually overshadowed by the outspoken Woodrow Wilson and his personal adviser, Colonel E. M. House.<sup>8</sup>

Lansing early expressed the American doubt over the

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<sup>7</sup>Daniel M. Smith, "Robert Lansing," An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, Norman A. Graebner (ed.) (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 103.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 101.





course of events in Russia. Following the December second armistice between the Central Powers and Russia, he sent a memorandum to the President:

I confess that I do not feel warranted in hazarding even a guess as to what the outcome will be. This makes the adopting of an active policy most difficult.

Historically the Russian situation is unprecedented. It is wholly novel. It seems to me that the controlling forces are idealism and ignorance supported by weapons. . . .

. . . . .

The correct policy for a government which believes in political institutions as they now exist and based on nationality and private property is to leave these dangerous idealists alone and have no direct dealings with them. To recognize them would give them an exalted idea of their own power, make them more insolent and impossible, and win their contempt, not their friendship.

. . . . .

"Do nothing" should be our policy until the black period of terrorism comes to an end and the rising tide of blood has run its course. It cannot last forever, but Russia will sink lower before better days come.<sup>9</sup>

In this memorandum, Lansing not only set the tone of future American action, but he expressed a deep pessimism for the future state of Russian affairs. He foresaw a continuing blood bath which would have to run its course and for which he had no solution except a passive one of "do nothing."

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<sup>9</sup>Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), p. 340.

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Lansing reports in his War Memoirs that on December 4, 1917, he had submitted to the President a draft declaration of a memorandum which would be a public statement on the recognition problem. He said, in part:

This government has found it impossible to recognize Lenin, Trotsky and their associates as the de facto government of Russia, since there is inadequate evidence that they are the real agents of the sovereignty of the Russian people. . . .

. . . . .

Relying upon a full realization by the Russian people of the imminent danger to their political and territorial integrity from autocratic Germany and upon their faithful adherence to their cobelligerents, this government has watched with disappointment and amazement the rise of class despotism in Petrograd and the open efforts of the leaders of the Bolsheviki to withdraw from the conflict even at the expense of national honor and the future safety of democracy in Russia.<sup>10</sup>

Lansing's object, so he states,

. . . was to avoid offending the Russian people and at the same time to indicate to them that recognition by the Bolshevik Government by the United States was out of the question in view of the character and purposes of that government.<sup>11</sup>

In any event, President Wilson did not choose to release such a public declaration, possibly because he was considering the famous Fourteen Points, which were subsequently stated in a special message to Congress on January 8, 1918.

There is evidence that Lansing's position rapidly hardened. President Wilson had refused to release Lansing's

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.



December 4 Memorandum, but he did direct that "the Russian situation be conducted along those lines."<sup>12</sup> When Ambassador Francis tentatively brought up the question of possibly recognizing the Bolshevik regime at the end of December, 1917, Lansing refused to consider any change in policy. Steps were taken to tighten up Russian diplomatic procedures. Edgar G. Sisson, who was the Petrograd Agent for the American Committee on Public Information, was rebuked for his interference with diplomatic affairs; General Judson, the United States Military Attaché, was recalled; and Ambassador Francis was instructed to hew to the policy he had himself earlier recommended.<sup>13</sup> In effect, a policy line was established which was later proclaimed more or less officially by Secretary of State Colby in 1920, reasserted by Secretary of State Hughes during the Harding and Coolidge Administrations, and which did not end until Soviet Russia was recognized by the United States on November 16, 1933.

There is little doubt but that President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points represented, in part, an attempt to go even further than the Bolsheviks in setting up a liberal program for peace. At the time, Wilson believed that the Brest-Litovsk negotiations "had been permanently suspended." Article Six dealt directly with the Russian problem. Wilson

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 345.

<sup>13</sup>Dulles, op. cit., p. 117.



Secondly, it is necessary to say that the Russian  
 situation is not without some interest.<sup>11</sup> When  
 the Soviet Government brought up the question of  
 recognizing the German regime at the end of 1939,  
 the German Government refused to consider any change in policy.  
 Since then there is a great deal of discussion  
 about it. It is not the purpose of this paper to  
 discuss the Soviet position, but to point out that  
 the German position is also of interest. The  
 United States policy is also of interest, and  
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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 111. <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 111.



set the tone by stating that

the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.<sup>14</sup>

The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk seemed to reinforce the nonrecognition stand of the United States towards the Soviet Union. The treaty posed many problems for Wilson's plans for a final peace. Secretary of State Lansing stated the official attitude of the United States:

. . . since the so-called Soviet Government upon which Germany has just forced . . . peace was never recognized by the Government of the United States as even a government de facto. . . [N]one of its acts, therefore, need be officially recognized by this government.<sup>15</sup>

American public opinion was becoming increasingly anti-Bolshevik. The crudely-expressed tenets of Bolshevism in the political, economic, and social fields with their avowed goal of universalism through world revolution were repugnant to the American point of view and, particularly, to that of the idealistic Woodrow Wilson. Thus, Wilson's initial policy of watchful waiting became increasingly a pursuit of the "Wilsonian principle of not recognizing any

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>15</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), I, 397.



government that did not conform to the American pattern of international morals."<sup>16</sup>

The problem of intervention became the sorest point of contention between the United States and Soviet Russia. Initially, both Wilson and Lansing were against intervention in Northern Russia and in Siberia. Under intense pressure from the Allies, Wilson finally broke down and agreed to limited intervention. In Northern Russia, the justification was the need to safeguard Allied supplies; in Siberia, it was to protect the Czechoslovak legion. In practicality, the entire issue of intervention was more complex. Certainly, there was the hope on the part of the United States that limited intervention would aid the development of an anti-Bolshevik Government. Time proved this hope to be in vain.

Another hope for the early rise of an anti-Bolshevik Government sprang from the tenuous existence of the Bolshevik regime in competition with several movements against it. In anticipation of the inability of the Bolsheviks to retain power, the United States considered aid to several separatist movements. As early as December 10, 1917, Lansing viewed the movement of General Kaledin and his Don Cossacks as a

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<sup>16</sup> Norman A. Graebner (ed.), The Cold War (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963), p. 26, citing Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The United States and Russia."







possible supplanter of the Bolsheviks.<sup>17</sup> The various movements, such as those of General Kaledin, General Denikin, and Admiral Kolchak among others, floundered on the shoals of ineptitude and internal dissension, however. At no time was de facto recognition extended to any of the separatist regimes, but United States aid to these movements served, as did intervention efforts, to incur the ill-will of the Bolsheviks.

President Wilson made several efforts to find a solution to the Russian enigma. On January 22, 1919, he submitted the Prinkipo Plan to Allied planners at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris. A plan was approved for all organized groups in Russia to send representatives to the Princes Islands, Sea of Marmara, to settle their differences.<sup>18</sup> The Bolsheviks accepted, but other groups would have no part in a meeting which would include the Bolsheviks; and the plan was abandoned.

Another effort was the sending of William C. Bullitt, a staff member of the American Peace Commission, to Russia on a secret mission to find a solution to some of the vexing

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<sup>17</sup>United States Department of State, The Lansing Papers (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), II, 343.

<sup>18</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919, Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), III, 31.

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problems which separated the United States and Russia. Bullitt entered Russia on March 16, 1919, and was impressed by the orderly control exercised by the Bolsheviks over territory under their control. Convinced of the inevitability of socialism in Russia, Bullitt drew up with the Soviet leaders an agreement which was to be instituted between Russia and the Allies. The document, dated March 12, 1919, laid the basis for a conference to negotiate peace between Russia and the Allies. Unfortunately, when Bullitt returned to Paris, he found Wilson preoccupied with other problems and received a cold shoulder. In addition, the campaign of Admiral Kolchak was going well at the time. Bullitt became embittered and resigned from the American Peace Delegation to return to the United States.<sup>19</sup>

Throughout the tortured remainder of Wilson's days in office, he continued his policy of not recognizing the Bolsheviks. After Lansing was fired by Wilson on February 13, 1920, he was replaced by Bainbridge Colby, who held much the same views as did both Wilson and Lansing on Russian recognition. In reply to a request by the Italian Ambassador concerning the United States views of the Russian-Polish situation, Secretary Colby set forth, on August 10, 1920,

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<sup>19</sup>Browder, op. cit., p. 11.







what is generally regarded as the most comprehensive exposition of the Wilson Administration's attitude toward Russia.

That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or the consent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incontestable fact. . . . At the moment when the work of creating a popular representative government, based upon universal suffrage, was nearing completion, the Bolsheviks, although in number an inconsiderable minority of the people, by force and cunning seized the power and machinery of government, and have continued to use them with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power.<sup>20</sup>

Colby further stated that it was impossible for the Government of the United States to recognize the Soviet Government because it "is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law." The Soviet Government refused to fulfill its international obligations and was wholeheartedly pledged to world revolution. "They have made it quite plain that they intend to use every means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote such revolutionary movements in other countries." The United States could not find any "common ground upon which it can stand with a power whose conception of international

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<sup>20</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), III, 466.

that the present situation in the world is a result of the failure of the United Nations to take effective action.

It is the duty of the United Nations to take effective action to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations should be able to prevent the outbreak of wars and to bring about a just and lasting peace. The United Nations should be able to settle disputes between states by peaceful means. The United Nations should be able to promote international cooperation and to develop friendly relations between states. The United Nations should be able to protect the rights of all peoples and to promote the well-being of all mankind.

The United Nations should be able to prevent the outbreak of wars and to bring about a just and lasting peace. The United Nations should be able to settle disputes between states by peaceful means. The United Nations should be able to promote international cooperation and to develop friendly relations between states. The United Nations should be able to protect the rights of all peoples and to promote the well-being of all mankind.

The United Nations should be able to prevent the outbreak of wars and to bring about a just and lasting peace. The United Nations should be able to settle disputes between states by peaceful means. The United Nations should be able to promote international cooperation and to develop friendly relations between states. The United Nations should be able to protect the rights of all peoples and to promote the well-being of all mankind.

relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense."<sup>21</sup>

Secretary Colby reinforced his 1920 pronouncement with a statement to the press on January 30, 1920, near the end of the Wilson Administration.

. . . [the] refusal to recognize the Soviet Government was due in the first place to the fact that it was itself the denial of self-determination to the Russian people, being a rule by men who violently usurped power and destroyed the democratic character of the Russian People's Government. Even more so, however, it was due to the fact that the Soviet authorities announced that they would not be bound by any of their solemn pledges, freely entered into, and the further fact that by their actions, in the case of several friendly nations, they have lived up to that announcement. There can be no useful and harmonious cooperation toward the end of placing civilization upon a sound basis with such men.<sup>22</sup>

There are a number of points about Wilson's policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet Union which stand out. First, it seems that Wilson had small choice at the time to do other than he did. Considering the confused nature of the intelligence of the times, and the crude, offensive actions of the Bolsheviks, Wilson had to wait. It would not have been prudent, considering the doubtful prospects of the Bolshevik Government, to have done otherwise.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 466-468.

<sup>22</sup>The New York Times, January 30, 1921, cited by N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), p. 19.



collection are so heavily laden in the past, so heavily so  
 burdened in the present, that...

...the policy of the Government...

...the policy of the Government...

...the policy of the Government...

...the policy of the Government...

...the policy of the Government...

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Second, Wilson stood upon principle. He refused to recognize the Soviet Government because (1) it did not have the sanction of the Russian people, and (2) it refused to respect its international obligations. As has been brought out in Chapter II, prior to Wilson, the recognition policy of the United States could be said, in general, to be a traditional one of recognizing any government no matter what its character so long as it, in fact, exercised control over the area of the state--that is, recognition of de facto governments. In dealing with the Kuerta regime in Mexico in 1913, Wilson stressed the methods by which the new government secured supremacy, whether civilized or barbaric, and to what extent recognition would further the cause of democracy.

Wilson found the nature of the Bolsheviks morally repugnant to him. The development of the Bolshevik Government made it natural for Wilson to carry his Mexican policy over to the Soviets. Regardless of the effectiveness of such policies of recognition, Wilson was being consistent when he applied them to the Bolsheviks. The chief criticism that can be made of Wilson's position is that such a policy is susceptible of becoming dogmatic and essentially negative. But it was, as Kennan puts it, "based squarely on principle."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Kennan, op. cit., p. 197.



As such, it is consistent with the morally idealistic tone of Wilson's philosophy. The Allies had started off on much the same tack as the United States, but for reasons of self-interest found it expedient to reverse their positions during the 1920's; the United States did not.

Such, then, was the inheritance of the new Republican Administration of Warren Gamaliel Harding. Under the leadership of the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, the policy of recognition was to continue. There was a difference, however. Wilson's approach of moral principle was to give way to a more pragmatic interpretation of what constituted international responsibility.





## CHAPTER IV

### HUGHES AND RECOGNITION

Charles Evans Hughes presided over the return of American foreign relations to so-called "normalcy" in the early nineteen twenties. He became Secretary of State on March 4, 1921. Between 1921 and 1925, he served under two Presidents, Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The relationship which had existed between Wilson and Lansing was now reversed. Both Harding and Coolidge had but a limited knowledge of foreign affairs and were content to leave the international field largely to their Secretary of State while they concentrated upon domestic politics. Hughes, although lacking expert knowledge in the international field, was a politician and a lawyer with "general characteristics of high intelligence, unquestioned integrity, and political availability."<sup>1</sup>

Hughes came into office at a time when the tide of nationalism was running high. There was a public disillusionment with diplomats which, coupled with a rising feeling of isolationism at home and resentment of the United States abroad, made for difficulty in directing the foreign

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<sup>1</sup>Norman A. Graebner, (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 131, citing John Chalmers Vinson, "Charles Evans Hughes."



relations of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Congress, reflecting the mood of the public, was interested in gaining Congressional control of all policies.

As a politician and a lawyer, Hughes recognized the mood of the times. It was perhaps inevitable that he "would adopt a narrow, factual, and legalistic view of the office of Secretary of State. He was once characterized as the 'diplomat of legalism, the diplomat of constitutionalism.'"<sup>3</sup> For Hughes, it was simply a further step to take Wilson's fundamental concept of a world based upon law and to inject his own brand of legal view. This also offered a way to come off the lonely Wilsonian perch of pure principle. It also fitted the Republican approach--which was the desire of the people at that time--to perfection, no matter if the Communists ridiculed it as a typical capitalistic viewpoint destined to bury itself. In short, Hughes returned to an earlier emphasis of his predecessors to protect American business. Hughes had never approved, for instance, Wilson's "laxity" in "dealing with Mexico."<sup>4</sup> This must have included Wilson's lack of regard for American business interests.

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<sup>2</sup>Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), p. 96.

<sup>3</sup>Vinson, op. cit., p. 132.

<sup>4</sup>Perkins, op. cit., p. 132.





Thus, Hughes retained elements of Wilson's moral approach to recognition, but they took a definite back seat to more strictly defined "legalistic" interests.

The effects of Hughes's pragmatic approach toward recognition were early evident. Left over from the Wilson Administration was a refusal to recognize the Obregon Government of Mexico. The United States proposed a treaty of amity and commerce which was "to remove all causes of difference between them."<sup>5</sup> President Obregon objected to certain parts of the treaty and refused to buy recognition at such a price. Thereupon, Secretary Hughes gave his view of the situation on June 7, 1921, in a formal pronouncement.

The fundamental question which confronts the Government of the United States in considering its relations with Mexico is the safeguarding of property rights against confiscation. . . . Whenever Mexico is ready to give assurance that she will perform her fundamental obligation in the protection both of persons and of rights of property validly acquired, there will be no obstacles to the most advantageous relations between the two peoples. . . . The question of recognition is a subordinate one, but there will be no difficulty as to this, for if General Obregon is ready to negotiate a proper treaty it is drawn so as to be negotiated with him and the making of the treaty in proper form will accomplish the recognition of the Government that makes it.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Taylor Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1928), p. 74.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 75.



The face value of this rather bold pronouncement, of course, was that Mexico could have recognition if she met the demands for guaranteeing American oil and property rights. Mexico refused; and the dispute dragged on until a mutual agreement, which was very satisfactory to the United States, was reached on August 31, 1923, and the Mexican Government of Obregon was finally recognized.<sup>7</sup> For our purposes, however, the importance of the Mexican episode is to demonstrate Hughes's regard for property rights and his basic approach to what he considered international responsibility to be in regard to recognition. Just as during Wilson's Administration, the conduct of the recognition problem with Mexico found a Russian parallel.

The change of United States Administration from Democratic to Republican in 1921 found Moscow entertaining the hope that the Republican victory would bring about a change in American policy toward Russia. Moscow, itself, had announced in March, 1921, the New Economic Policy, or NEP, which represented a marked change in Soviet internal economic policy. The NEP, the end of the civil war, and the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement presaged an apparent willingness to negotiate on the part of the Soviets. On March 21, 1921, shortly after the inauguration of President Harding,

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 77.







Maxim Litvinov transmitted an appeal for the resumption of relations between the two nations from M. Kalinin, President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The message mentioned the previous aversion of President Wilson to the Soviet Union and stated the hope that the new American Government would perceive the advantages of "the re-establishment of business relations and will consider the interests of both people which imperatively demand that the wall existing between them should be removed." The pledge of noninterference in American affairs was renewed.<sup>8</sup>

The answer by Hughes, the new Secretary of State, speedily dashed any illusion Moscow may have entertained concerning the position of the new Republican Administration. On March 25, Hughes said:

The Government of the United States views with deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the people of Russia and desires to aid by every appropriate means in promoting proper opportunities through which commerce can be established upon a sound basis. It is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade, as the supplies which Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good can result so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate. It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic basis of

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<sup>8</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), II, 763-764.



production are securely established. Production is conditional upon the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor.

If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations.<sup>9</sup>

This meant, of course, that the Harding Administration was not going to change the basic United States policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet Union. There was here certainly an increased emphasis upon economic rehabilitation. It is noteworthy that the Secretary of Commerce at this time was Herbert Hoover, who held very strong anti-Bolshevik views. The United States and the Western Governments had pursued a more or less common policy of nonrecognition since November of 1917, but "with the lifting of the economic blockade by the Supreme Council in January, 1920, however, the united front began to crack."<sup>10</sup> This was followed by the signing of a British-Soviet trade agreement on March 16, 1921, by Sir Robert Horne and Leonid Krassin. In effect, of course, this created a de facto recognition by

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 758.

<sup>10</sup>Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 272.







Great Britain and brought the attention of the commercial world to the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union. Since the United States had itself lifted the ban against commercial dealings with Moscow in 1920, it follows, therefore, that the Department of State was very concerned over the combined question of recognition and trade.

The prime objective of the United States appears to have been an "economic rehabilitation" of Russia.<sup>11</sup> The New Economic Policy of the Bolsheviki was considered an encouraging step in the "right" direction, and it must have been hoped that nonrecognition would keep the pressure on and speed up the economic change. The fact that similar tactics had been tried and proved unsuccessful in regard to the basic political nature of the Soviet regime since 1917 did not bode well for the venture with economic pressure.

Through 1921 and 1922, a number of events occurred on the periphery of the recognition problem with the Soviet Union. There was the famine relief program which lasted from 1921 into 1923 and was responsible for saving many Russian lives. There were also the conferences with Russia at Geneva and the Hague. These will be touched upon in the next chapter. Two other events were the ending of the

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 202.



Ambassadorship of Bakhmetev and the recognition of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

The position of Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev as Ambassador of Russia had been somewhat anomalous since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Despite the fact that he represented no real government, Mr. Bakhmetev continued to be recognized by the United States as Ambassador of Russia for nearly five years. There was initially some basis for the procedure. There was the constant anticipation of the downfall of the Bolsheviks. There was also the expedient presence of someone to handle the business transactions which carried over from the Kerensky Government. In view of the repudiation by the Bolsheviks of past debts and responsibilities, this was a considerable service. Last, it would appear that the entire matter was characterized by inertia. The United States began by playing the waiting game and merely continued to do so, despite the fact that the situation daily grew more ridiculous.

This rump legation indeed lacked not for funds and influence. In addition to unexpended credits made available previously to the Kerensky Provisional Government, there was a large amount of Russian assets in the United States to be liquidated.

Politically, Bakhmetev continued to make himself heard on all matters involving Russia. As titular head of





the not inconsiderable group of Russian emigrés from Czarist and Provisional Government days, the Ambassador from Russia had a good deal of influence. With good reason, also, the Bolsheviks protested against the financial and material aid furnished to the separatist groups, such as that of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, by Bakhmetev.

The conclusion of intervention and the triumph of the Bolsheviks put an end to any hopes Bakhmetev might have entertained. On April 28, 1922, he notified Secretary Hughes that he proposed to retire on June 30, 1922. The financial attaché, Serge Ughet, was proposed in the role of Russian agent and custodian of property.<sup>12</sup> Secretary Hughes replied the next day that he agreed

. . . inasmuch as the liquidation and final settlement of the business of the Russian Government in the United States for which you were responsible is now practically completed, and as your continuance as Ambassador under the existing circumstances may give rise to misunderstanding.<sup>13</sup>

Mr. Serge Ughet remained with his diplomatic status unchanged. Thus, Ambassador Bakhmetev's status was terminated. But Hughes let it be known in a formal statement on June 4, 1922, that nothing had really changed.

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<sup>12</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), II, 875-876.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 876-877.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 175-177.

The termination of Mr. Bakhmeteff's duties as Russian Ambassador in this country has no bearing whatsoever upon the question of the recognition of the Soviet régime in Russia, which is entirely a separate matter.<sup>14</sup>

One of Wilson's policies toward the Russian matter was a respect for Russia's territorial integrity. From the Fourteen Points on, President Wilson insisted that Russia not be dismembered at the Peace Conference table or elsewhere. In the previously-mentioned Colby note of August, 1920, the United States had refused to recognize any dismemberment or the granting of independence to certain regions with the legitimate exception of Poland, Finland, and Armenia.<sup>15</sup>

Requests from various people seeking independence, such as the Ukrainians, were repeatedly turned down. The policy was that "Russia's co-operation and agreement" must be a pre-requisite.<sup>16</sup> This position in regard to the Baltic States proved difficult to maintain particularly since Moscow itself had proclaimed the independence of the Baltic States. Following Allied recognition of Estonia and Latvia on January 27, 1921, and of Lithuania on June 20, 1922, the

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<sup>14</sup>N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), p. 14.

<sup>15</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), III, pp. 466-468.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 467.







Department of State announced recognition for the three Baltic countries effective on the morning of July 28, 1922.<sup>17</sup> A prime consideration in delaying recognition had been the fear of encouraging "Japanese expansionist ambitions in the Far East."<sup>18</sup> The United States reaffirmed its principle of not disturbing Russian territory but now simply removed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the status of being considered Russian soil.

The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed condition of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population.<sup>19</sup>

The recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States was urged by many within this country. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho was especially outspoken, as were several business groups. Recognition was generally urged on two grounds: (1) that the Soviet Union fulfilled the de facto requirements of stability; and (2) on the basis of encouraging commercial relations.<sup>20</sup> Secretary Hughes did not accept these views. On May 21, 1923, he received a

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 873.

<sup>18</sup>The New York Times, January 28, 1921, 3:6.

<sup>19</sup>U. S. State Department, Papers, 1922, op. cit., II, 873.

<sup>20</sup>Perkins, op. cit., p. 126.

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delegation representing the "Committee for Recognition of Russia" of the Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom. The committee contended that requirements for recognition had largely been met by "recent" actions at Moscow.<sup>21</sup> Hughes replied that the solution to Russia's problem must come from inside Russia. There was little to be gained economically by establishing closer relation with the Soviet Union. People who had established relations had fared little better than those who had not. Recognition could not impose trade which depended upon economic factors. The Russians had not yet supplied "what is essential" to improve their own lot. Hughes stated that he did "recognize fully the distinction between matters exclusively of economic import, and the matter of diplomatic relations."

. . . the fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations. Stability, of course, is important; stability is essential. Some speak as though stability was all that was necessary. What would avail mere stability if it were stability in the prosecution of a policy of repudiation and confiscation? In the case of Russia we have a very easy test of a matter of fundamental importance, and that is of good faith in the discharge of international obligations. . . .

. . . . .

Here is a simple test. We have in this case no need to speculate, as of what avail are assurances

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<sup>21</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 230.







when we find properties taken, without compensation or restoration. . . .<sup>22</sup>

In addition, Hughes reminded the group of the fact that the Communists encourage world revolution and that this meant America as well as Europe. What he desired to see, declared Hughes, was "evidence of the abandonment of that policy."<sup>23</sup>

It is evident from Hughes's pronouncement on March 21 that he was stressing principle but that it was not precisely the same principle of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson bypassed traditional de facto standards to stress the methods by which a government secured supremacy and the methods of rule--whether civilized or barbaric. International obligation was first a matter of willingness to live up to accepted standards of moral conduct and constitutionality. Hughes also bypassed traditional de facto requirements. Mere "stability" was not all. A government must be willing to meet its international obligations and these obligations were synonymous with "American rights and claims."<sup>24</sup> This meant that the Soviet Government must give up "its policies of repudiation, confiscation, and encouragement of world

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<sup>22</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), II, 755-758.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Cole, op. cit., p. 77.

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revolution." To forge ahead economically or otherwise, Russia must abandon Communism.<sup>25</sup> Hughes had not dropped Wilsonian principles; he merely put them on a more pragmatic basis of self-interest.

This approach of Hughes's became more clear in July, 1923, in an exchange of letters with the President of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers. As a labor leader, Gompers opposed recognition of the Soviet Union. On July 9, 1923, he wrote to Hughes that he was increasingly disturbed by "the statement that economic conditions in Russia are improving, that the Soviet authority is proving stable . . . and that the American Government . . . should extend recognition to the Soviets." Gompers added that he regarded it a "vital principle" that the essence of the recognition problem was that the rulers of Russia are "a tyrannical minority imposing themselves on a reluctant people."<sup>26</sup>

Hughes, however, did not agree in his reply on July 19, 1923. He believed that such was not necessarily so in view of past precedent. The Department of State must regard the situation "in somewhat less general terms." Although

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<sup>25</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 231.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1923, II, op. cit., 758-759.

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Jefferson had emphasized the "will of the nation," this must be put in perspective.

It must be borne in mind, however, that while this Government has laid stress upon the value of expressed popular approval in determining whether a new government should be recognized, it has never insisted that the will of the people of a foreign State may not be manifested by long continued acquiescence in a regime actually functioning as a government.

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Recognition is an invitation to intercourse. It is accompanied on the part of the new government by the clearly implied or express promise to fulfill the obligation of intercourse. . . . In the case of the existing regime in Russia, there has not only been the tyrannical procedure to which you refer, and which has caused the question of the submission or acquiescence of the Russian people to remain an open one, but also a repudiation of the obligations inherent in international intercourse and a defiance of the principles upon which alone it can be conducted.

.....

The obligations of Russia to the taxpayers of the United States remain repudiated.<sup>27</sup>

The foregoing statements are self-explanatory and serve to point up the consistent pattern of Hughes's approach to recognition. There appears little doubt that the views of Presidents Harding and Coolidge accorded much with the views of Hughes. Both, unlike Wilson, "accepted rather than dictated the policies of the Secretary of State."<sup>28</sup> Harding, in a last address not delivered because of illness, stated:

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 760-764.

<sup>28</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 233.

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The problem of Russian recognition is complicated by a fundamental difficulty, because of a government régime there whose very existence is predicated upon a policy of confiscation and repudiation.

.....

. . . I prefer to safeguard our interests and hold unsullied the seemingly proven principles under which human rights and property rights are blended in the supreme inspiration to human endeavor.<sup>29</sup>

The death of President Harding in San Francisco on August 2, 1923, brought Calvin Coolidge, a man no less conservative and heedful of property rights, to the Presidency. On December 6, 1923, President Coolidge listed, in a message to Congress, the requirements for any reconsideration of America's Russian policy.

Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government, not by the Tsar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia, whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentance; our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act.<sup>30</sup>

Evidently encouraged by this statement, the Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin telegraphed to President

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<sup>29</sup> The New York Times, August 1, 1923, 2:5.

<sup>30</sup> United States Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 65, p. 451, December 20, 1923, cited by N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations With Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), p. 21.







Coolidge on December 16, 1923, to express the willingness of the Soviet Government "to enter into negotiation with American government and to remove all misunderstandings and differences between the two countries." Chicherin stated that the Soviets were "fully prepared to negotiate" on the "question of claims mentioned in your message" on "assumption that principle [sic] reciprocity recognized all around."<sup>31</sup>

The reply of Secretary Hughes on December 18, 1923, was so direct and brutally frank that it worked effectively to discourage for some years any subsequent moves to mend relations between the two nations. Hughes stated:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them, they can do so. . . . Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned.<sup>32</sup>

The state of relations which existed at the time of Hughes's reply to Chicherin in 1923 was destined to continue for ten years until 1933, when the Democratic Administration

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<sup>31</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1923, II, op. cit., p. 787.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 788.

On July 10, 1955, the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, issued a statement in which he stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East. He stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The President's statement was a direct result of the fact that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East. He stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The President's statement was a direct result of the fact that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East. He stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The President's statement was a direct result of the fact that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East. He stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The President's statement was a direct result of the fact that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East. He stated that the United States was not in a position to make any statement regarding the situation in the Middle East.

of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union after an interval of sixteen years. Meanwhile the other major powers of the world had recognized the Soviet Union during the years 1924 and 1925.

The stand of Hughes on nonrecognition of the Soviet Union has been sufficiently documented. Viewed in the context of his times, he took what appeared to be a very logical position. Hughes, unlike Wilson, stressed the material interests of American citizens. Like Wilson, Hughes was willing to bypass the traditional requirements of de facto recognition. Hughes was unwilling to stand primarily on the principle of moral repugnance and lack of freely expressed people's will, however. He would not discard these views but insisted upon placing emphasis upon the unorthodox economic policies of the Bolsheviks. Hughes realized the difficulty in condemning the Communists on the basis of being plain "no good."

It is possible that the Republicans would have reconsidered their policy toward the Soviet Union "had it not been for the Communist tenets of confiscation of property, repudiation of debts, and world revolution."<sup>33</sup> This is doubtful, however, in view of the anti-Communist mood of the

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<sup>33</sup>Robert Paul Browder, Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 18.







American people, a rising nationalist emotion which emphasized such stands as a demand for repayment to the United States of war debts from Allies as well as from foes and the Soviet Union, a Congress bent upon asserting its leadership, and a man of the narrow legal views of Hughes himself.

Hughes felt strongly an obligation to protect American interests. To him, such interests were fully as important, if not more so, than any moral debate over the legitimacy and civilized intent of the Soviet regime.



## CHAPTER V

### THE DOMESTIC SCENE

Any examination of the recognition policy of the United States towards Soviet Russia from 1917 through 1923 would be woefully incomplete, if not misleading, were not the impact and influences of the domestic scene to be included. The inward tug of domestic politics served to undercut the importance of international affairs. This trend became very evident during the last years in office of Woodrow Wilson during which he waged his political battle for League of Nations membership for the United States. It became well established with successive Republic Administrations during the 1920's. However, this isolationist tendency was not, by any means, the whole story. There was also waged a propaganda battle which reached the very corners of the nation and which was more often characterized by a near hysterical crescendo of anti-Communist hatred than by any more rational considerations.

#### The Great Red Scare<sup>1</sup>

In retrospect, it can be seen that the wave of emotional bias which sprang up in the United States following

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<sup>1</sup>See Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), Chapter X.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The political situation of the Republic of China

Since the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911

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the Republic of China has remained a republic, and has

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION

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It is a republic, it is a republic, it is a republic,  
it is a republic, it is a republic, it is a republic.



the success of the Bolshevik Revolution 1917 was but one of several emotional high tides which have come and gone since the inception of the United States. There have been conflicts between warlike fervor and a dedication to peaceful solutions of difficulties, between expansionism and isolationism, between liberalism and conservatism.

This does not mean, of course, that much of the antipathy toward the Bolsheviks which sprang up in the United States did not have a good basis in fact. The antagonistic political philosophies and even more antagonistic modes of expression of the new Bolshevik Government have already been mentioned. Terror, with its accompanying disregard for human life, was an instrument of the Bolsheviks in their war against counter-revolutionaries. The success of the dictatorship of the proletariat was furthered by mass executions and atrocities.

But if the shortcomings of the Bolsheviks were a damaging indictment of their cause, it must also be admitted that a truly objective view of the new Soviet Government by the West was not forthcoming. The account which emerged was one in which one side only received a consistent hearing. Much of the same opprobrium which had attached to the Germans quickly fell to the Bolsheviks.<sup>2</sup> The tendency to

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<sup>2</sup>Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 151.

the success of the National Convention 1917 was not only the  
 several hundred right ideas which were used and some ideas  
 the foundation of the United States. These have been con-  
 sidered before, which have not a distinction in general  
 relations of different, between organization and human  
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... This does not mean, of course, that much of the  
 activity toward the National Convention which was in the  
 United States did not have a good basis in fact. The in-  
 dependent political organization and some more independent  
 basis of organization to the new National Convention have al-  
 ready been mentioned. (Latter) with the accompanying in-  
 crease in power like, was an instrument of the National  
 in fact and again under-represented. The success  
 of the National Convention of the National Convention was achieved by the  
 relations and relations.

... But is the achievement of the National Convention a  
 complete triumph of this kind? It was also the success  
 that a truly objective view of the new United States was  
 the year was not forthcoming. The success which was not  
 one in which one also only received a complete victory.

... That of the new organization which has resulted in the new  
 more power fell to the National Convention. The success is

discredit the enemy, to accept at face value every charge made against him, to equate one side with the moral righteousness and the other with savagery and lust for power—became a part of the approach between the Allies and Bolshevik Russia.

This link between the Bolsheviks and the Germans was confirmed in the minds of many by the Sisson Documents which were released by the United States Committee on Public Information in the middle of September, 1918. Edgar G. Sisson, special representative in Russia of the United States Committee on Public Information, had compiled a series of documents which purported that the Bolshevik leaders were in the pay of Germany. The November Revolution was a product of German Imperial Staff planning and financed with German funds while the entire Bolshevik Government was a device for betraying the Russian people.<sup>3</sup>

Although these documents were of dubious nature and suspect from the beginning, the newspaper coverage of them, in addition to the official nature of their release, caused them to be widely accepted by the people of the United States. Despite the fact that the documents were ultimately discredited, they had gone far to create an atmosphere in which

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<sup>3</sup>The New York Times, September 16, 1918, 11:1, cited by F. L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), pp. 152-153.







any charge of corruption and cruelty against the Bolsheviks would be readily accepted.<sup>4</sup>

The Sisson Documents complemented the feeling of resentment which had arisen in the United States over the virtual surrender of the Bolsheviks to the Germans which was signified by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. To the United States, as indeed to the Allies in general, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was viewed as a disaster of the first magnitude. Not only had the Russians violated a treaty agreement not to make a separate peace, but they had allegedly caused the loss of many thousands of Allied lives by such action, not to mention the billions of dollars of additional expenditure needed to defeat Germany.

This, of course, was true, as far as it went. It did not take into consideration the inability of Russia to participate further in any war against Germany. Be this as it may, there was a general tendency among the Allies to lay the blame for much of their hardship upon the heads of the Bolsheviks who had betrayed them to Germany.<sup>5</sup> The end of the war, consequently, did not lead to a lessening of anti-Bolshevik feeling among the Allies. With every fresh Soviet excess, there was a fresh torrent of condemnation.

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<sup>4</sup>Dulles, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>5</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 153.

any change of ownership and thereby maintain the balance  
 would be really necessary.<sup>1</sup> The same principle governed the timing of  
 payment which had taken in the United States over the  
 virtual surrender of the colonies to the common enemy and  
 signified by the treaty of Westphalia, to the United  
 States, as looked to the allies in general, the treaty of  
 Westphalia was viewed as a disaster of the first order.  
 But only the British viewed it as a treaty of peace.  
 not to make a separate peace, but they had already signed  
 the treaty of Westphalia of 1648 with the Dutch.  
 not to mention the allies of France in additional support  
 during treaty to France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  
 This, at least, was true in the case of the allies.  
 not made any concession to the treaty of Westphalia in the  
 slightest manner in any one of the allies, in 1648 in the  
 way, for it was a general treaty among the allies in the  
 the allies for each of their countries, they the allies of the  
 Netherlands was not regarded then as Germany.<sup>2</sup> The end of  
 the war, nevertheless, did not lead to a breaking of the  
 balance treaty among the allies. With every treaty under  
 which, there was a treaty between the allies.

<sup>1</sup>Collier, op. cit., p. 444.

<sup>2</sup>Collier, op. cit., p. 444.

Much of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda was inspired by governmental agencies to justify Allied action and to further Allied interests, such as the intervention efforts.<sup>6</sup> There was, however, one aspect in which the Russian situation differed significantly from that of Germany previously. Propaganda of the war between the Allies and the Central Powers was largely between governments. The chief contents of anti-Bolshevik propaganda were supplied to a large degree by private and unofficial sources. These included the numerous groups of Russian émigrés, dispossessed noblemen, "expropriated bourgeoisie," and exiled intellectuals and political leaders who had fled their native Russia in the wake of the March and November Revolutions. These groups, who had lost everything, hated those who had dispossessed them; and they did all within their power to remedy the situation so that they could return to their native land. They found a sympathetic ear in much of the world outside Russia and kept up a persistent bombardment of words--most of which bore little relation to reality.

The influence of these exiles and their propaganda was far out of proportion to their numbers or importance and lingered on long after their cause was patently hopeless to

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<sup>6</sup>Dulles, op. cit., pp. 154-155.







all.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Boris Bakhmetev, the previously-mentioned Ambassador from the Provisional Government to the United States, became a natural mouthpiece for many of these groups since he was still officially in the diplomatic chain of correspondence, although he did not represent any effective government. Other groups found sympathetic organizations both in the United States and abroad to take up their cause.

Direct appeals were made to the American public by these groups. Attention and sympathy, as well as financial assistance, were obtained in this way for military ventures against the Bolsheviks such as those headed by General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak. Congressional investigations and records were filled with the words of these groups, who were very available for any anti-Bolshevik investigation. It was, in fact, difficult for anyone sympathetic to the Communist cause to make himself heard. Thus, official Congressional reports were filled with the same bids for attention which characterized newspaper accounts of the period.<sup>8</sup>

The immediate aim of most of these groups was to increase Allied intervention plus greater material assistance

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<sup>7</sup> Schuman, op. cit., p. 151.

<sup>8</sup> See United States Congress, Senate, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 66th Congress, 2d Session, pursuant to Senate Resolution 263, Russian Propaganda Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920).



to organized anti-Bolshevik resistance organizations inside Russia. Considerable pressure was applied in an attempt to gain recognition for the Omsk Government.<sup>9</sup> Typical of these appeals was one made by a group of New Yorkers in April of 1919 to "all Americans who are not Bolsheviks, anarchists, I.W.W.'s, Non-Partisan Leaguers, nor Socialists" in an effort to enlist aid for Kolchak and Denikin:

Bolshevism is the assault of greed, ignorance and brute force upon everything that Americans have learned to hold most sacred. It destroys liberty, property rights, law, order, marriage, the home and education. It is the murderer of peace, enlightenment and progress. Its loot enriches a few black-hearted and red-handed leaders and beggars everybody else.<sup>10</sup>

American newspapers of the period were somewhat less than objective in their reporting of the Russian situation. They were prone to follow Washington's lead and to publish almost any news or rumor about the Bolsheviks without verification. The story of the "nationalization of women" was an example. This fantastic and shocking story had its beginnings in a mélange of distorted facts in April, 1918, which were primarily based upon sketchy reporting of Soviet legislation on divorce, marriage, family, and the like. From these grew a burgeoning tale of the "nationalizing" of all Soviet women for the purposes of the Soviet State. Despite the fact that

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<sup>9</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 157.

<sup>10</sup>The New York Times, April 27, 1919; 7:1.



1. The first group of students, consisting of 100 students, was selected from the first 100 students who applied to the University of California, Berkeley, in 1969. This group of students was selected from the first 100 students who applied to the University of California, Berkeley, in 1969. This group of students was selected from the first 100 students who applied to the University of California, Berkeley, in 1969.

[illegible][illegible]

The following are the names of the persons who have been identified as having been involved in the activities of the group during the period from January 1968 to December 1970:



the United States Department of State denied the rumor in February of 1919, the story was widely carried in newspapers and over radio media throughout the world.<sup>11</sup> Subsequent retractions and denials did little to erase the perverted view of the Soviet State which was confirmed in the minds of many of the public by such an abstraction.

A study of American newspaper headlines, particularly in the year 1919, gives a good perspective of the sensationalism attached to much of the reporting about the Soviet Government.<sup>12</sup> There are sensational headlines of massacre and evil deeds perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. Reporters of the period seem to have vied with one another in searching for new adjectives to describe the latest actions of the Bolsheviks. The public seems to have conveniently forgotten from day to day that the predicted disasters and reported tragedies had a way of evaporating only to be replaced by more reports.

There was, of course, some substance to the charges of massacre, of destruction of property, of attacks upon religion, and other evil deeds, but, in general, the facts were distorted out of any close semblance to reality. The

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<sup>11</sup>Dulles, op. cit., p. 158.

<sup>12</sup>See The New York Times headlines for the month of June, 1919, as a typical example.



cruelest hoax was that the average citizen was continually informed that the end was in sight--that the fall of the Bolshevik Government was imminent. Thus, with a few exceptions "the daily newspapers throughout 1919 and much of 1920 announced almost every week, . . . that the Soviet Government had collapsed or was collapsing . . . ." <sup>13</sup> This was in part a carryover from the early period of Bolshevism when the American and Allied Governments had optimistically based their Russian policy upon the hope of the early demise of the Bolshevik regime.

In view of the security fears evidenced by the anti-Communist campaigns waged in the United States, it was natural that the organizational activities of Socialists or any Left-Wing groups within the United States would be watched closely. In point of fact, Communist propaganda had small success. But the organization of an American Communist Party in September of 1919 was viewed as an ominous fact. <sup>14</sup> The party, which grew out of a split in the Socialist Party of the United States, became the Communist Labor Party led by John Reed. Driven underground for a time, it emerged in 1921 as the Workers Party of America. <sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>14</sup>Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), I, 117-118.

<sup>15</sup>Dulles, op. cit., p. 161.







Despite the fact that Communism in America remained primarily a creed of a small part of the intelligentsia, the American Communist Party became the focus of anti-Communist efforts. The year 1919 was marked by growing industrial strife in the United States, and the Communists were accused of fomenting the trouble.<sup>16</sup> In the latter part of 1919 and climaxing in mass raids upon Communist headquarters throughout the country on New Year's Day, 1920, thousands of men and women suspected of Communist sympathies were rounded up. Most were released, but Ellis Island was crowded. "On December 22, 1919, the transport Buford, popularly known as the 'Soviet Ark,' sailed back from New York for Russia with some 249 Reds 'to be taken back to where they came from.'"<sup>17</sup>

The roundup continued throughout 1920 and came to be known as "The Deportations Delirium of 1920."<sup>18</sup> One who was caught up in the net as an enemy alien who sought to overthrow by force the Government of the United States was Ludwig C. A. K. Martens. Martens, a German subject who had been born in Russia, had on March 19, 1919, sent to the United States Department of State a set of credentials as the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 163-164.

<sup>18</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 185.



Affairs in the United States.<sup>19</sup> The United States refused to recognize Martens, but he distributed Soviet literature while attempting to establish trade contacts. In 1920, the Labor Department indicted Martens as an undesirable alien to be deported. Martens, who had increasingly become the target of American anti-Communist propaganda, left New York on January 22, 1921, on the Liner Stockholm, which had come to be called the "second Soviet Ark" because of the seventy-five deportees it carried.<sup>20</sup>

As has been previously mentioned, Secretary Colby's note to the Italian Ambassador on August 10, 1920, marked the "crystallization" of Wilson's policy toward Soviet Russia."<sup>21</sup> The year 1920 also marked the high point of anti-Communist agitation in the United States. From that time on, the hysterical tone which had come to characterize the approach of the United States toward the Soviet Union abated. There would be less emotion and perhaps more reason in the official and unofficial attitudes toward the Soviets. The underlying base of hostility was still there, however, and continued to affect relationships throughout the whole of the 1920's.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>20</sup>The New York Times, January 22, 1921, 1:7.

<sup>21</sup>Dulles, op. cit., p. 168.





### The Muffled Twenties

The period of the 1920's has assumed a special niche in American history. It is a part of the body of American lore that the decade of the 1920's is referred to as the "Roaring Twenties." It is hailed somewhat nostalgically as a boisterous, carefree period when the world was America's oyster. This may be, but while we roared on the domestic scene, our efforts in international diplomacy echoed like a dull thud.

There was no one really willing to pick up Wilson's tarnished mantle and carry out his principles. The public indeed appeared disillusioned with diplomats and diplomacy. The men and the mood of the times combined to dictate the approach which Kennan has termed "legalistic-moralistic."<sup>22</sup> Arnold Toynbee has characterized the mood of the time:

The non-recognition of the Soviet Government had been one of the political luxuries in which the United States had felt itself free to indulge during the period of peculiar local prosperity in North America which may be said to have begun on the morrow of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, and to have ended with the break on Wall Street in the autumn of 1929 on the economic plane, and on the political plane with the Japanese outbreak in Manchuria in the autumn of 1931. During those years of prosperity the Americans had felt no need of Russia's good will, either in politics or in trade, while they had resented the existence of the Communist regime, in the former domain of the Russian Czardom, as an incarnate criticism--

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<sup>22</sup>George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 82.



outrageously insolent and insufferably inept--of an established system of society whose virtue was demonstrated, in the American opinion of the day, by the dazzling success of its local incarnation in the United States.

This passionate and almost personal antagonism to the Soviet Government was prevalent, during the years of prosperity in the United States, in the American-born upper stratum of the American working class as well as among the bourgeois business men, small and great; and any sympathy towards Soviet Russia which was manifested by the American proletariat or intelligentsia was branded as "un-American" and subversive by the makers of orthodox American public opinion.<sup>23</sup>

Toynbee is somewhat harsh. He fails to give proper importance to a growing United States-Soviet trade which reached a high point in 1930-1931. Nevertheless, he has well summarized the times. The twenties were somewhat an island unto themselves, and the actors well fitted the scene. Neither Presidents Harding nor Coolidge were well fitted to assume the leadership in the area of foreign affairs. Harding was a man of "mediocre" intellect and "Coolidge was congenitally cautious, incapable of powerful or effective leadership."<sup>24</sup> Charles Evans Hughes and his successor, Frank B. Kellogg, were given free rein as Secretaries of State under Chief Executives who were not primarily

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<sup>23</sup>Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs - 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 532.

<sup>24</sup>Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion," The Diplomats 1919-1933, edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1963), I, 285.



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concerned with international issues and were certainly not noted for energy. The pattern set by Hughes and confirmed by Kellogg, at least as far as the recognition of Russia was involved, became so ingrained that it persisted through the term in office of Herbert Hoover and his Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. Stimson may have had ideas of his own, but Herbert Hoover was a powerful personality in his own right and left no doubt about his distaste for the Soviet Government.

The prosperity of the United States and the forces stemming from that prosperity thus served to concentrate "American attention upon domestic rather than foreign affairs."<sup>25</sup> The desire of the American people to return to what Warren G. Harding called "normalcy" automatically created an antagonism toward the disturbing forces unleashed by the Soviets. It can be seen that throughout the 1920's the relationship between the United States and Soviet Russia reflected as much as anything else "the interaction of economic and social developments" within the two nations.<sup>26</sup> This does not mean that the subject of recognition ceased to exist during the 1920's. But there was certainly no overriding sense of urgency, as there had been previously in

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Dulles, op. cit., p. 180.



relation with Soviet Russia. Recognition became a favorite topic along with jazz, Harding Administration scandals, prohibition, and Babe Ruth. Real knowledge about the Soviet Union remained vague and contradictory. Any radical activity or extreme liberalism was identified with Communism and was opposed on the basis of not being in "the American Way."<sup>27</sup>

There were vigorous proponents of recognition just as there were vigorous opponents. The minority in favor of recognition stressed the advantages of resuming trade and diplomatic relations with a government whose de facto existence could not be challenged. The subversive aims of the Communists were admitted but doubt expressed as to the existence of any real danger to the United States.<sup>28</sup> The United States Senator from Idaho, William Borah, who became Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee upon the death of Senator Lodge in 1924, believed that recognition of Russia would not imply approval of Communism, but would indicate "a determination to transact necessary international business with the only governmental authority in Russia."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations with Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), p. 27.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.





Borah's views were supported by American commercial and industrial interests which cared not about political principles but about Russia as a market for business and trade.

The opponents to recognition were often well organized and powerful. They included among others: the American Federation of Labor, the Catholic Church, Patriotic Societies, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the American Legion, and the general American public. The American Federation of Labor under the leadership of Samuel Gompers was especially adamant in its opposition to the Government of the Soviet Union--an understandable posture in view of Soviet labor policies.<sup>30</sup>

Still, all in all, there was no one organization or issue which determined the overall policy of nonrecognition, but rather the "whole complex of Soviet acts," which the American public dealt with under the name of "Communism." A popular vote at any time during the 1920's would probably have returned a majority for the course of the State Department. The people were in no mood to allow the dangerous liberal philosophy of Communism to interrupt their prosperous and conservative capitalist way of life.

An interesting episode in the United States-Soviet

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<sup>30</sup> Robert Paul Browder, Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 22.



relationship during this period was the famine relief undertaken by Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration in the Soviet Union from September, 1921, when the actual assistance began, to its completion in July, 1923.<sup>31</sup>

On July 13, 1921, Doctor Fridtjof Nansen, the world famous Norwegian statesman and Arctic explorer, received a copy of a telegram sent by Maxim Gorky to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of New York asking for famine assistance.<sup>32</sup> Soviet Russia had been stricken by a famine of appalling proportions and needed immediate assistance. Nansen forwarded the letter through the United States Minister in Norway to Secretary of State Hughes.<sup>33</sup> Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, proposed aid through the American Relief Administration which he headed. The American Government was in favor, but insisted that the entire operation be carried on by the A.R.A. and that the United States Government not be officially involved.

The non-involvement of the United States Government was, of course, a diplomatic nicety not a reality. It

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<sup>31</sup>Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 228.

<sup>32</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States - 1921 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), II, 804-805.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 804.







preserved the fiction of nonrecognition while allowing the United States to act. On August 20, 1921, after the Soviet Government had met certain specifications laid down by Secretary Hoover, the agreement setting up the operation was signed by Maxim Litvinov for the Soviet Union and by Walter Brown for the American Relief Administration.<sup>34</sup> One of the conditions for the cooperation of the American Relief Administration had been the release of all American prisoners detained in Russia. This accomplished in one step what all previous negotiations had failed to do in this line. The agreement itself consisted of some twenty-seven articles. Article twenty-five read as follows:

That its personnel [A.R.A.] in Russia will confine themselves strictly to the ministration of relief and will engage in no political activity or commercial activity whatever.<sup>35</sup>

The operation lasted for two years and proved fully as successful as Herbert Hoover's previous ministrations of American aid following World War I. Although the Russians had hoped that the operation would mean the furthering of relations between the two nations, they were disappointed. The agreement was made entirely with the American Relief Administration and was non-political in that it did not represent a departure from previous American policy.<sup>36</sup> The

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 810-818.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 817.

<sup>36</sup>The New York Times, August 21, 1921, 1:7.

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situation had not been entirely unofficial since the American Congress had had to vote to supply the American Relief Administration with the necessary supplies. The Senate had debated the issue but finally voted the requested relief supplies without acting on the recognition question.<sup>37</sup>

The issues of the domestic scene were very much reflected in the approach of Secretary Hughes to the problem of Soviet recognition. The pragmatic, legalistic approach of Hughes was calculated to fit the political mood of the people and reflected the confidence of the American public in the 1920's to "go it alone." Woodrow Wilson's stand on recognition, as expressed in Colby's letter of August 20, 1920, had been based upon principle. Such a stand may well have been justified, but it did not lend itself to the prevalent mood of the 1920's. The universal fear and hatred of Bolshevism which boiled over during Wilson's Administration subsided in the face of a rising tide of isolationism and domestic egocentrism which was powerfully supported by popular feeling and ancient tradition.

Anti-Bolshevik antipathy gradually subsided from its violent peaks of 1919 and 1920, but it served effectively to mass public support behind the Republican Administration policy of Soviet nonrecognition. The pragmatic policy of

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<sup>37</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 205.







Hughes was consonant with the prosperous, self-satisfied materialistic tenor of the American domestic scene. It would not be until the need for trade became more acute that a real attack on Soviet nonrecognition would be mounted.

Communism in the United States had assumed by 1923 much the same character it has maintained to this day—that of a "whipping-boy" to be used to justify any sort of "America first" conduct. The attitude of the American Government toward the question of famine relief for the Soviet Union was typical of the period. The United States felt that it had demonstrated its regard for the Russian people through the actions of Hoover's American Relief Administration. Whatever moral obligation there was had also been fulfilled. Overall, it is understandable that the United States Department of State felt far from being on the defensive over its position on Russian recognition during the 1920's.

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE DEBT QUESTION

The Soviet Government made official its repudiation of past debts when it issued a decree on January 21, 1918, which canceled obligations owed to foreign governments and to foreign nationals.

1. All national loans concluded by the governments of Russian landowners and Russian Bourgeoisie enumerated in specially published lists are annulled [annihilated] from December 1, 1917. The December coupons of these loans are not subject to payment.

2. In the same manner are annulled all guarantees given by the said governments on loans for different undertakings and institutions.

3. Unconditionally and without exception, all foreign loans are annulled.<sup>1</sup>

The repudiation of past debts by the new Bolshevik Government of Russia was understood by the Allied Government for exactly what it was--one in a series of blows against established Bourgeois order. The Allies refused to accept this edict, just as they refused to accept other Bolshevik pronouncements, in the expectation of the early collapse of the new regime.

For the United States, the problem of debt settlement

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<sup>1</sup>Leo Pasvolsky and Harold G. Moulton, Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1924), pp. 197-198.

The Soviet Government has indicated its willingness to pay for the goods which it has ordered from the United States. It has also indicated its willingness to pay for the goods which it has ordered from the United States.

2. All national loans covered by the program must be for the purpose of financing the development of the country and must be for the purpose of financing the development of the country and must be for the purpose of financing the development of the country.

2. In the same manner are handled all payments given by the said government or bank for different undertakings and institutions.

The reputation of past leaders by the new leadership movement of Russia was shattered by the Allied intervention. For nearly two decades in a series of three special warlike expeditions under the Allied command to occupy this whole, just as they returned to occupy other territories. In the aftermath of the early military of the new nation.



was to develop ramifications little suspected in 1917. Because of the Soviet stand on debt repudiation, the question of the Soviet debt to the United States did not enter into the negotiations for the settlement of the inter-Allied war debts. Yet, the position which the United States adopted in the matter of debt repayments by its allies inevitably affected the position on the Russian debt matter also. In this respect, the United States had left very little room for maneuver, even if it had so desired. Its position became, in effect, locked in.

For the first time in its existence as a nation, the United States found itself transformed into a major creditor nation at the conclusion of World War I. During the war and immediately after, some twenty nations had borrowed approximately \$10,338,000,000 from the United States. Of this amount, Great Britain and France owed the lion's share. In fact, the borrowings of Great Britain, France, and Italy accounted for about 90 per cent of the total sum owed to the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The total Russian war and pre-war debt approximated some six billions of dollars.<sup>3</sup> The major share of this

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<sup>2</sup>Charles Merz, "To Revise Or Not To Revise: The Debts Issue," International Conciliation, No. 287 (February, 1933), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Pasvolsky and Moulton, op. cit., pp. 180-181.



amount was owed to Great Britain and France. There was no previous Russian debt owed to the United States by Russia.

In 1917,

the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, made certain loans to the Provisional Government of Russia for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defense and prosecuting the war. The net amount of the loans so made . . .

was \$187,729,750.<sup>4</sup> No further loans were made to the Treasury of the Russian Government after November, 1917. In addition, debts outstanding to the United States consisted of bond issues floated by the Imperial Russian Government on the American market and claims resulting from confiscation and nationalization of property by the Bolsheviks. The total has been variously estimated but did approximate some \$700,000,000.<sup>5</sup>

There appears to be little doubt that the \$10.3 billion dollars advanced by the United States to friendly governments throughout and immediately following the war period had been regarded as loans by both lender and receivers. Some few had spoken up to say that the money should

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<sup>4</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States - 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), II, 880.

<sup>5</sup>N. D. Houghton, "Policy of the United States and Other Nations With Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917-1929," International Conciliation, No. 247 (February, 1929), pp. 20-21.



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The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, may extend the period for the payment of the principal of the loan to such extent as he may deem proper.

It means to give power to the people.

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be regarded as America's contribution to the war effort and that Europe was in no position to repay such sums. These voices were disregarded, however. From the first, President Wilson refused to consider cancellation of the debts or to discuss them at the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>6</sup>

In taking his stand, Wilson was but reflecting public opinion. In the wake of nationalism which swept the United States, American people "saw only that they had played a decisive part in the winning of the war . . . and that the United States had little to show" for its part.<sup>7</sup> Any suggestion to forgive the debts aroused the immediate antipathy of the American people. Thus, when Great Britain suggested twice in 1920 that war debts be generally canceled, it was informed that the American people would sanction no cancellation, either in whole or in part.<sup>8</sup>

The chief problem among the Allies over the debt problem became that of reparations. The European debtor

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<sup>6</sup>B. H. Williams, The Economic Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1929), p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats 1919-1939 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), I, 301, citing Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion."

<sup>8</sup>Leo Pasvolsky and H. G. Moulton, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1932), pp. 52-70, cited by Julius W. Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 560.



governments insisted that debt repayment must hinge upon the collection of reparation from Germany. The United States refused to consider the two as being related.<sup>9</sup> At the Paris Peace Conference, a Reparation Commission was set up to report by May, 1921, its findings.

The reparations figure set by the Commission in May of 1921 was one hundred and thirty-two billion marks, or approximately thirty-three billion dollars.<sup>10</sup> Germany, of course, could not keep up payments and defaulted within fifteen months--setting off a chain reaction which ended in general defaulting on debt payments by the European countries and the occupation by the French and Belgium armies of the Ruhr in January, 1923.<sup>11</sup>

For the United States, the debt issue was never happily settled. The Republican Administration of President Harding was just as determined as had been the preceding Democratic Administration to collect the debts owed to the United States and was just as unsuccessful. By an act of February 9, 1922, Congress created the World War Foreign Debt Commission which was authorized to negotiate settlement upon the basis that "no portion of any debt might be

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<sup>9</sup>Julius W. Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 562.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.







cancelled." Between May of 1923 and May of 1926, agreements were made with thirteen countries at varying interest rates--based on a hypothetical ability to pay. The last agreement was made with Austria in 1930.<sup>12</sup>

These efforts came to no avail, however, as nations continued to default. Germany was never able to carry the load of reparations. Thus, a succession of plans--the Dawes Plan in September of 1924 and the Young Plan in January of 1930 came to nothing. The Hoover Moratorium marked the practical end of all debt payment on June 20, 1931.<sup>13</sup>

Against such a background, the rigid American attitude toward the Soviet repudiation of debts as well as other international responsibilities can be more fully understood. The United States position in demanding that the Soviet Government honor its obligations was consistent with official policy which was applied to friend and foe alike.

What did the Soviets want as they bargained with the Western nations in 1921? They obviously were looking for credit. They desperately needed capital to get their economy moving. Second, they wanted trade in order to utilize the wealth of Russian raw materials to gain badly-needed imports. Finally, they were looking for diplomatic recognition which they hoped would ease their position in

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 561.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 569.

concluded. Between May 18 1914 and May 25 1914, negotiations were held with various countries at various intervals—based on a hypothetical ship of 1000 tons. The first agreement was made with Britain in 1914.<sup>14</sup>

There were two main points to be settled, however, as Britain continued to demand. Firstly, the water was to carry the load of construction. Thus, a commission of five—two from each of the countries at 1914 and the young ship in January of 1914 was to be formed. The Soviet Government asked the question and at all times proposed to June 20, 1914.<sup>15</sup>

There was a hypothesis, the first Russian ship was to be built for the first expedition at 1914 as well as other international responsibilities and to be very important. The United States position in January, 1914 was very different from its position in January, 1914. This policy was applied to 1914 and the other.

That the first ship was to be built with the Russian nation in 1914. They naturally were looking for results. They obviously needed capital to get their economy better. Russia, they needed state to order to build the ship of 1000 tons and materials to get built. Russia, they were looking for materials. Russia, they were looking for materials. Russia, they were looking for materials. Russia, they were looking for materials.

the world and gain prestige for the Communist cause.<sup>14</sup> They were willing to give concessions to gain these ends, as was so often announced to the world, but they were not willing to sacrifice the revolution which they had brought about.

The Soviet willingness to bargain was evidenced by an almost eager acceptance of any opportunity to meet with Allied representatives. Wilson's invitation to all "organized" groups to meet at Prinkipo was quickly accepted by the Bolsheviks.<sup>15</sup> Chicherin's acceptance telegram indicated a desire to negotiate, but was subtly insolent in its tone.

In view of the special importance which not only the press, but also the representatives of the Entente Governments, attach in their oft-repeated statements to the question of loans, the Soviet Government declares itself, in the first place, willing to meet the demands of the Entente Powers on this point. It does not refuse [to recognize its financial obligations to its creditors who are the subject of The Entente Powers, leaving the precise formulation of the manner in which this point is to be enforced to the special Treaties, the elaboration of which is to be one of the tasks of the proposed negotiations. . . .]<sup>16</sup>

As previously has been mentioned, the Prinkipo meeting never came about because other Russian groups refused to meet with the Bolsheviks. They did not wish to see the

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<sup>14</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia and the West (New York: The New American Library, 1962), p. 175.

<sup>15</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 31.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 40.







Bolsheviks recognized, and they were somewhat dismayed at the terms of Wilson's invitation.

The next contact with the Soviet Government was by the Bullitt Mission. Bullitt, who was impressed by the stability of the Soviet Government, drew up on March 12, 1919, a document which was to serve as the basis for future negotiations. The Soviet authorities expressed their willingness to meet with the Allies and agreed upon certain conditions. These included "mutual recognition by all governments on the territory of the old Russian Empire; and the acknowledgment by these states of their obligation to pay part of the Russian debt owed the Allies. . . ." <sup>17</sup>

At the meeting during which the pact was drawn up, Litvinov proposed to Bullitt a plan by which the United States would take over all Allied claims against Russia and to cancel in return a corresponding part of Allied debts to Washington. <sup>18</sup> By this interesting arrangement, the Soviet Government hoped to simplify its debts and perhaps to gain a more preferred creditor. Bullitt's high hopes were dashed when he found himself virtually ignored when he returned to Paris and, thus, nothing came of any of his plans.

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<sup>17</sup>Robert Paul Browder, Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 11.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



If President Wilson had demanded full Soviet payment of debts, Secretary of State Hughes of the Harding Administration was even more adamant. Hughes lost no time in not only demanding full satisfaction of Soviet responsibilities, but also equated his demands with possible recognition. Wilson had never demanded debt payment as a price of recognition.

In early 1922, the United States was invited to participate in an economic and financial conference to be opened at Genoa on March 8, 1922.<sup>19</sup> This proposed conference had an interesting background. Originally, it had been scheduled to take up the problem of German reparations, but French concern over security interests and suspicions of British intentions led to the fall of the Briand Government. Poincaré, the new premier, wanted no one to interfere with his own solution for reparations.<sup>20</sup> The Genoa Conference, thus, became chiefly a Russian matter. On January 6, the Supreme Council Meeting at Cannes called for an Economic and Financial Conference to meet on March 8 at Genoa, Italy.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), II, 387.

<sup>20</sup>Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 231.

<sup>21</sup>Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 217.



The following information was obtained from the records of the  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., on the  
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—William Dawkins, 2007 <sup>81</sup> *SCS v. Davis*, 353 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

and, similarly, named to include and go into the evidence  
the following: the following information was obtained from the

1. The first of these is the fact that the Government has not yet decided whether it will accept the offer of the United States to purchase the surplus stocks of the Government.

his own solution for repetition.<sup>10</sup> The Greek Commission,

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The Soviet Union was invited and, at once, accepted. The United States was invited, as previously mentioned, but refused. Secretary of State Hughes, in replying to the formal invitation of Ambassador Ricci of Italy, said:

. . . it has been found impossible to escape the conclusion that the proposed conference is not primarily an economic conference, as questions appear to have been scheduled for consideration without the satisfactory determination of which the chief causes of economic disturbance must continue to operate, but is rather a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate.<sup>22</sup>

This meant, of course, that the United States wanted nothing to do with the Soviet Union. American interests were upheld by the presence of the United States Ambassador to Italy, Mr. R. W. Child, who attended the conference as an unofficial observer.

At the Genoa Conference, Soviet statesmen had an opportunity to meet face to face with the Western statesmen. The results were not encouraging. On April 16, 1922, the conference was thrown into an uproar by the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo by Chicherin of the Soviet Union and Walter Rathenau of Germany. By the Treaty of Rapallo, the Soviet Union and Germany mutually renounced compensation for war and civil damage inflicted by one state upon the

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<sup>22</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922, op. cit., I, 393.



other.<sup>23</sup> This buttressed Soviet resistance to Allied demands made upon Soviet Russia in a document drawn up on April 28.

The chief import of the document was that assistance would be forthcoming for Russia "as soon as security in Russia has been re-established for former owners and debts are recognized." The Russian Soviet Government must recognize "all public debts and obligations, which have been contracted for or guaranteed by the Imperial Russian Government or the Russian Provisional Government or by the Soviet Government towards foreign powers." The Allies, meanwhile, could not admit to any liability for claims brought by the Soviet Government

for loss and damage suffered during the revolution in Russia since the war. [Further, the Soviet Government was] . . . to restore or compensate all foreign interests for loss or damage caused to them when property has been confiscated or withheld.<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet reply rejected Allied demands. The Soviets claimed that they had come to Genoa with a "number of schemes and proposals regarding the credits and loans required by Russia in exchange for real guarantees" and concession. This hope had been thwarted, however. The Soviet

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<sup>23</sup>Fischer, op. cit., p. 250.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922, op. cit., II, 777-780.







Government could not submit to political demands. Further, the Soviets said:

From a legal point of view, Russia is therefore in no way bound to pay debts contracted in the past, to restore property or compensate its former owners, or to pay indemnities for other losses occasioned to foreign subjects. . . . Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation, and in the hope of reaching an agreement with all the Powers, Russia has accepted the principle contained in the third of the Conner Conditions, under condition of reciprocity.

. . . . .

The war debts having been incurred for a specific purpose, were automatically cancelled by the fact that Russia, having retired from the war and having no share in its advantages, could not be expected to share its cost. With this exception, the Russian Delegation has expressed its readiness to agree to the payment of state debts, on condition that the losses caused to Russia by intervention and blockade are recognized.<sup>25</sup>

In short, Chicherin declared his government's readiness to accept past obligations, with the exception of war debts, provided Soviet counterclaims for intervention and blockade were recognized. Against claims of other governments against Russia totaling \$13,000,000,000, Chicherin presented counterclaims of some \$60,000,000,000. The Soviet counterclaims could be scaled down if certain considerations were received.<sup>26</sup>

The Allied Governments were in no mood to consider

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 792-803.

<sup>26</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 302.



such Soviet demands. The Soviet Government was willing to meet Allied demands only if the Allies would furnish the necessary credits and grant reciprocity to Soviet counter-claims. The Genoa Conference adjourned on May 19 with an agreement to continue at the Hague on June 15, 1921.<sup>27</sup>

The failure of the Genoa Conference seemed to confirm the outlook of the American State Department on the futility of attempting to deal with the Soviet Government. The proposed Hague Conference was looked upon in the same light. Until the Soviets changed their approach, negotiation was fruitless. In refusing an invitation for American participation, Hughes stated:

This Government, however, is unable to conclude that it can helpfully participate in the meeting at the Hague as this would appear to be a continuance under a different nomenclature of the Genoa Conference and destined to encounter the same difficulties. . . .<sup>28</sup>

The Hague Conference was, indeed, a continuation of Genoa. The study was broken down into three areas of debts, private property, and credits. No accord could be reached in any of these areas. The Soviet attitude was basically the same as at Genoa--that Soviet concessions would be forthcoming if credits were granted. Any compensation for

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 220.

<sup>28</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922, op. cit., II, 808.







nationalized property or pre-war debts was a "matter of expediency to secure a loan." Further, no war debts would be recognized.<sup>29</sup> The Hague Conference closed on July 20, 1922, without having accomplished any of its goals.

Earlier in July, Secretary of Commerce Hoover and Secretary of State Hughes had agreed to sending a technical study mission "to Russia to study the economic situation."<sup>30</sup> The proposal was broached to the Soviets through the United States Ambassador to Germany Houghton. The reply by Chicherin, on August 28, 1922, reflects the delicate nature of relations between the United States and Russia at that time.

As for the admission into Russia of an American committee of experts or of inquiry, which would obviously be a step of greater bearing, involving much more difficult issues, the Russian Government would consent thereto if a certain reciprocity was admitted; namely if Russian commercial delegates were allowed to visit the United States of America in order to study the American market and trade conditions.<sup>31</sup>

Official Washington was just as sensitive, however, and replied that "no Soviet commission could be received in the United States because of the danger of propaganda."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 221.

<sup>30</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922, op. cit., II, 825.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 830.

<sup>32</sup>The New York Times, August 31, 1922, 3:1. (Partial quote of reply text.)

1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to determine whether a problem exists. This is done by comparing the current situation with the desired situation. If there is a difference, a problem exists.

water treatment to remove bacteria. The water will be treated by the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles and will be used for drinking water.

Chicherin ended the dialogue on September 16 by a statement in which he called for the restoration of Soviet-American economic relations, but on a basis of equality and reciprocity.<sup>33</sup>

The position of the United States and its European Allies over the debt problem was, then, somewhat ironical. The Western-European Allies were demanding reparations of Germany. The United States demanded its just debts from the Western-European Allies. Simultaneously, both were making similar demands upon Russia. The whole picture can only be understood as a "complex of international monetary claims that dominated relations among the great powers in the wake of World War I."<sup>34</sup>

In point of view of international law, a good case could be made for the validity of both the Allied claims and at least a portion of Soviet counterclaims. The Soviet Government unleashed its original order of repudiation as a blow at "international capitalism," but soon found its revolutionary ardor cooled in the face of the sober realities of daily economic life. This accounts for the continual modification of the Soviet stand over its responsibility for

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<sup>33</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1922, op. cit., II, 833.

<sup>34</sup>Kennan, Russia and the West, op. cit., p. 191.



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It is a well-known fact that the German people are not only the most industrious and hard-working, but also the most patriotic and loyal. This is why they have been able to overcome all the difficulties and hardships that have befallen them in the past. They have always stood firm and have never been defeated. This is the reason why they are now the most powerful nation in the world.



repudiated debts and nationalized property. Whether the Soviet Government would have lived up to any promises if credit had been forthcoming is conjectural. A safer statement would be that Soviet Russia was simple unable, as was most of Europe, to pay such debts.

For the United States, the official view was that past obligations must be recognized as evidence of good faith. As long as repudiation and confiscation were adhered to as principles of conduct by the Soviet Union, the United States could not consider recognition. Thus, the Republican Administrations of Harding and Coolidge made debt payment a direct prerequisite of recognition.

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## CHAPTER VII

### TRADE AND RECOGNITION

On July 7, 1920, the United States removed the restrictions on trade with Soviet Russia. American diplomats and consular officers were instructed, however, to take no action which would "officially or unofficially, directly or indirectly, assist or facilitate commercial or other dealings" between the United States and Soviet Russia.<sup>1</sup> By this action, the United States, in effect, lifted an embargo on trade relations which had been imposed February, 1918, upon Soviet Russia by a policy of refusing to issue export licenses with that country. It was evident, however, that the Department of State was less concerned about the lifting of the embargo than about its policy of nonrecognition.<sup>2</sup>

The announcement of the Department of State of the lifting of the embargo stated that "restrictions which have heretofore stood in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia were today removed by action of the Department of State" with the exception of "materials susceptible of immediate use for war purposes." It was emphasized that the

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<sup>1</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), III, pp. 717-719.

<sup>2</sup>The New York Times, July 10, 1920, 14:4.





status of political recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States was not changed by the action. Trade would be carried out by individuals and corporations at their own risk, because "the assistance which the United States can extend to its citizens who engage in trade or travel in some foreign country cannot be looked for in the present case."<sup>3</sup>

Despite the evident distaste of the State Department for lifting the embargo, the action was almost an inevitable result of the removing of the blockade of Soviet Russia by the Allied Supreme Council in January of 1920. Many of the nations of the world had then moved to resume economic relations with Russia. President Woodrow Wilson had attempted to achieve unity of Allied actions in all dealings with Soviet Russia, but his plans failed and each of the Allies pursued its own independent policy.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the American move was politically an expedient, so as not to lag too far behind the remainder of the world on the matter of furthering trade in any quarter.

In 1920, the desire to trade was a national concomitant of the existence of people and nations. The Bolsheviks

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<sup>3</sup>Statement to the Press, July 7, 1920. Text in The New York Times, July 8, 1920, 1:2.

<sup>4</sup>Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), p. 194.



realized full well the magnetic attraction of profit and felt that they could turn this urge of "capitalism" to their own advantage. This premise was correct, even if it did not bear full expected fruits for the Bolsheviks. In the instance of the United States, trade relations remained the chief point of contact over the years until eventual recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933. However, the belief of the Kremlin that normal relations would follow when the need for formalizing trade relations became evident was not to be realized.

One of the first efforts of the Soviet Government to break the commerce barrier between Soviet Russia and the United States was the abortive attempt of Mr. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens on March 19, 1919, to gain recognition as the representative as the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the United States.<sup>5</sup> Martens' credentials were accompanied by a memorandum extolling the virtues of Soviet Russia and expressing a desire to negotiate the opening of commercial relations between the two countries. Martens was ignored by the Department of State, but he remained in the United States, attempting with little success to establish trade operations, until his deportation in January, 1921. As has

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<sup>5</sup>Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), III, 114; see also, supra, pp. 62-63.



[illegible]



been previously mentioned, anti-Communist emotion in the United States, in addition to Department of State disapproval, rendered Martens' position untenable from the onset.

One of the problems faced by Martens in his efforts to establish trade relations was the question of Soviet payment for desired goods. American businessmen were willing to sell, and the Soviet Government was eager to buy; but the question of payment was next to impossible because normal credit channels were cut off. Gold would have been an immediate answer, but the July, 1920, embargo lifting did not raise a ban imposed in the same year on the acceptance of Soviet gold by the Mint and Assay Offices of the United States.<sup>6</sup> The prohibition had been imposed since it was maintained that the repudiation by the Soviet Government of Russia's state debts and its confiscation of foreign property left the title of any gold coming from Russia to be legally in doubt.

This problem was partially alleviated on December 20, 1920, when the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board announced the suspending of "all rules and regulations restricting the exportation of coin, bullion, and currency to that part of Russia now under the control of the so-called Bolshevik Government." Also suspended were

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<sup>6</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 257.

been previously discussed, and Committee action is the  
 only action, in addition to the action of the  
 House, which would be necessary to bring the  
 bill into effect. The bill is now in the  
 hands of the Finance Committee, and the  
 Committee is now considering the bill. The  
 bill is now in the hands of the Finance  
 Committee, and the Committee is now considering  
 the bill. The bill is now in the hands of  
 the Finance Committee, and the Committee is  
 now considering the bill. The bill is now  
 in the hands of the Finance Committee, and  
 the Committee is now considering the bill.

all rules and regulations "restricting dealings or exchange transactions in Russian rubles, or restricting transfers of credit or exchange transactions . . . effective December 18, 1920, until further notice."<sup>7</sup> This action was helpful, but it still did not solve the basic Soviet problem in the areas of obtaining long-term credits or disposing of its gold on the United States market.

At the beginning of the year 1921, then, there were no "formal legal restrictions on the exchange of commodities between Russia and the United States" with the exception of "the export of war supplies."<sup>8</sup> The different character of trade with the Soviet Government in that American businessmen had to deal with the Soviet State rather than with private businessmen worked against increased commercial ventures. The United States Department of State would give no assurances of the safety of any transactions. This, in effect, constituted a tacit official discouragement of trade attempts. Combined with the practical limitation of lack of long-term credits and the threat of legal confiscation of Soviet gold, it can be appreciated that the course of Russo-American trade was a hazardous one.

The potential of the Soviet market was too great an

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<sup>7</sup>The New York Times, December 21, 1920, 17:7.

<sup>8</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 196.







inducement to overcome, however. Once the doors to Soviet trade were opened, the total volume increased rapidly.<sup>9</sup> The adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1921 by the Soviet Government, undoubtedly, stimulated Russian interest in trade. This expansion of trade took place without the usual assistance from the facilities of the United States in such a case. Organizations did arise to facilitate the trade. The Products Exchange Corporation was founded in New York in 1919 and began effective operation when the economic embargo was lifted in 1920. The London branch of the Soviet trading company, ARCOS, opened a New York Branch in 1924. In May of 1924, the Products Exchange Corporation and ARCOS merged to form AMTORG, which thereafter was the chief trading agency in the United States.<sup>10</sup>

A decided incentive for American businessmen was the signing of the Anglo-Russian trade accord on March 16, 1921, by Sir Robert Horne and Leonid Krassin. This agreement notably came just a week after Lenin had given to the Tenth Party Congress his proposals for a tax in kind on agricultural products. The tax was to be an important part of the New Economic Policy.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Robert Paul Browder, Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 25.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 25-26.

<sup>11</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 288.

industrial in character, however, from the point of view of the  
 tests were applied, the point of view remained roughly the same.  
 addition of the new documents being in 1913 by the United  
 Government, subsequently, although various reasons in  
 kind. This evidence of such close alliance between the United  
 States and the facilities of the United States is very  
 a matter of organization this view to facilitate the work.

The Federal Reserve Corporation was founded in 1913 in New York in  
 1913 and was a private corporation when the Federal Reserve  
 was added in 1913. The Federal Reserve of the United States  
 company, 1913, against a New York branch in 1914. In 1914  
 1914, the Federal Reserve Corporation was added to the  
 from 1913, which included the first Federal Reserve  
 in the United States.<sup>10</sup>

A Federal Reserve for American business was the  
 object of the Federal Reserve from 1913 to 1914.  
 by the Federal Reserve and the Federal Reserve. This agreement  
 security was that it was added to the Federal Reserve  
 they consider the Federal Reserve for a fee in kind in addition  
 their property. The fee was to be in the Federal Reserve in the  
 New Federal Reserve.<sup>11</sup>

Robert Paul Anderson, Chief of Federal Reserve  
 Division, Federal Reserve System, 1913, 1914.

10. Federal Reserve, 1913, 1914, 1915.

In any event, the Anglo-Soviet trade pact was the first of several such pacts to be made by Soviet Russia in the following two years. The pact involved a de facto British recognition of the Soviet Government, trade resumption, repatriation of prisoners, deferment of settlement of financial claims, and a reciprocal declaration to refrain from hostile acts.<sup>12</sup>

What was the official attitude of the United States over the matter of trade and recognition in the case of the Soviet Union? Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor, queried Secretary of State Hughes about this in a letter of March 15, 1921:

There is much propaganda being circulated in the United States claiming that the demand for manufactured goods in Russia is so great and the purchasing power of the Russian Soviet government so vast that it is almost impossible to determine the actual capacity of the Russian market to absorb goods of foreign manufacture.

.....

It is alleged that the Federal Reserve Board has refused to permit the transfer of funds to the United States from the Soviet Russian government in order to pay for the goods, although payment in gold is guaranteed.

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Another claim is that if the restrictions placed on trade with Russia were removed it would place in operation many mills, shops and factories now closed

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<sup>12</sup>Schuman, op. cit., p. 127.







down and would give employment to the unemployed of America.

Gompers went on to repeat condemnations of the Soviet Government by the American Federation of Labor and to ask for a "publication of the facts" by the United States Government.<sup>13</sup>

In his answer to Gompers on April 5, 1921, Hughes made a point of stressing the economic prostrations of Russia and the fact that "the unfortunate situation . . . described is [not] likely to be alleviated so long as the present political and economic situation continues." While other nations of the world were also nearly economically destitute, these other nations were taking actions to restore "confidence" while "the attitude and action of the present authorities of Russia have tended to undermine its political and economic relations with other countries." Consequently, the Russians were unable to obtain needed credit. The resulting effect "is that Russia is unable to renew normal economic activities. . . ."

Although the Russians had placed "perhaps six and one half million dollars' worth of orders," the resulting shipments had been small "because the Soviet agents were unable to pay cash or to obtain credit so as to insure the delivery of the goods ordered." It would be useless to recognize the

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<sup>13</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1921, op. cit., II, pp. 760-762.



"so-called Soviet Government" in the hope of increasing trade because Russia "does not today have on hand for export commodities which might be made the basis of immediate profitable trade with the United States."<sup>14</sup>

In this reply to Gompers, Secretary of State Hughes was, in essence, stating two principles upon which he was to stand for the whole of his tenure as Secretary of State. First, recognition of the Soviet Government would bring about no marked increase in trade because Soviet Russia was in no position to carry out any such trade; and, two, Soviet Russia was not going to see any improvement in its situation until it changed its political ways. This stand of Hughes was evidenced again and again.

The letter of Maxim Litvinov to President Harding has been previously mentioned.<sup>15</sup> In it, Litvinov asked for United States recognition of the Soviet Government and passed on from the All Russian Central Executive Committee "a formal proposal of opening trade relations between Russia and America. . . ."<sup>16</sup>

Hughes's reply on March 25, 1921, stressed the futility of the existing trade possibilities in Soviet Russia and that "fundamental changes" would be necessary to restore

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 769-770.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 762-764.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 764.

"so-called United Government" is the hope of tomorrow.  
 Since Russia is not a state, it is not a country.  
 Communist who wish to make the U.S.S.R. a state,  
 must first make it a country.<sup>12</sup>

In this reply to Comrade, Secretary of State, Mr.  
 A. A. Gromyko, stating two principles upon which he was to  
 stand for the whole of his tenure as Secretary of State,  
 first, recognition of the Soviet Government would bring  
 about no marked increase in trade between the U.S.S.R. and  
 the U.S. in no position to carry out any trade with the U.S.S.R.  
 Russia was not going to see any improvement in its situation  
 until it changed its political ways. This was the hope  
 and wish of the U.S. and the world.

The latter of these two principles is the one which has  
 been previously mentioned.<sup>13</sup> In its letter dated the  
 United States recognition of the Soviet Government and  
 Russia on from the All American People's Committee  
 to formal proposal of opening trade relations between Russia  
 and America. . . .<sup>14</sup>

Secretary's reply on March 11, 1947, stated the re-  
 sult of the existing trade possibilities in Soviet Russia  
 and that "fundamental changes" would be necessary in order

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 184-185.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 184-185.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 184-185.



productivity.<sup>17</sup> By coincidence, on the same day that the Litvinov communication had been received, Herbert Hoover, the new Secretary of Commerce, issued a statement on Russian trade which backed up the stand taken by Secretary Hughes.

The question of trade with Russia is far more a political question than an economic one so long as Russia is under the control of the Bolsheviki. Under their economic system, no matter how much they moderate it in name, there can be no real return to production in Russia, and therefore Russia will have no considerable commodities to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports. . . . That requires the abandonment of their present economic system.<sup>18</sup>

On December 6 of the same year, Secretary Hoover again expressed his views on the subject to the Secretary of State. The occasion was a proposal to encourage "Germany as an intermediary" for future trade with Russia. Hoover could not agree to the proposal as "being in American interest."

At the present moment, although other powers have recognized the present Russian government and we have refused to do so, yet Americans are infinitely more popular in Russia and our Government more deeply respected by even the Bolsheviks than any other. The relief measures already initiated . . . and . . . other factors, will enable the Americans to undertake the leadership in the reconstruction of Russia when the proper moment arrives.

. . . . .

The hope of our commerce lies in the establishment of American firms abroad, distributing American goods under American direction; in the building of direct

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 768.

<sup>18</sup>The New York Times, March 23, 1921, 1:2.

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The Commission has been informed by the Secretary of State that the Commission has been asked to consider the possibility of establishing a new Commission to investigate the activities of the Communist Party of the United States.

The question of Russia's economic development is far more a political question than an economic one as long as Russia is under the control of the Bolsheviks. Under their economic system, no matter how many they make use of to make things out of their system to produce this or that, and therefore Russia will have no economic competition to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports. . . . The economic development of this present economic system is

On December 1 of the same year, Secretary Hoover

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THE ABOVE IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE  
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ON  
MAY 1, 1964, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION  
MADE BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS  
ON APRIL 29, 1964.

American financing and above all, in the installation of American technology in Russian industries.<sup>19</sup>

It can be seen that Secretary of State Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Hoover thought basically alike on the problem of Soviet Russia. It was inevitable that the influence of two such strongminded individuals would prevail in the Russian operation, particularly in view of the relative impotence of President Harding and his successor, President Coolidge, in international policy making.

The basic approach of both Hoover and Hughes with respect to Russian trade was that, since Soviet Russia was incapable of carrying out a worthwhile trade, there was no sense in the United States becoming involved in any trade program which would involve changing the basic stand of non-recognition toward the Soviet Union. Restoration of political relations could have little or no economic effect because of the economic vacuum which existed inside Soviet Russia. American-Russian commerce was, of necessity, based upon economic factors which were hopeless as long as the Bolshevik regime remained in power. An exchange of Ambassadors and Consular representatives would be useless because the Soviet state monopoly for all sales and purchases would leave no opportunity for encouraging business.

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<sup>19</sup>U.S. Department of State, Papers, 1921, op. cit., II, 787-788.







The primary object of the United States was to see an economic rehabilitation of Russia. This meant, of course, a Russia which would be both capable and willing to carry out its international responsibilities. It followed that this desired condition could not be achieved as long as Russia was dominated by the Bolsheviks.

By the same reasoning, long-term credits were not granted to the Soviet Union because the United States failed to recognize Soviet Russia, but because Soviet Russia had not lived up to its international obligations in canceling debts, confiscating foreign property, and promoting world revolution. Thus, recognition, per se, would not alter the problem and credits still could not be granted as long as Soviet Russia continued a program of repudiation.

As has been stressed previously, one of the major differences between the Wilson Administration and that of Harding over the problem of its recognition of Soviet Russia was a shift in emphasis from a moral repugnance to a more material base. In the field of trade promotion with the Soviet Union, there was a similar shift of emphasis from Wilson to Harding. Wilson desired the economic rehabilitation of Russia, but such a desire never became a controlling factor as it did in the approach of Charles Evans Hughes to the problem of trade.

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There are some other general comments which can be made in this same area. For Soviet Russia, the overriding need was for credits, both long and short term, in order to get its economy moving. Lenin, from the first, was interested in obtaining specific agreements to help Soviet Russia out of its immediate financial difficulties. He was not interested in compromising his revolution any more than he was forced to, but he was willing to bargain--up to a point.

Of the Russian aims for credit, trade, and recognition, the West was willing to come quickly to terms only on trade--as long as long-term credits were not mandatory. Even in the United States, the major nation which remained hostile longest to the Soviet Union, trade expanded despite lack of official protection for investments. The United States was not so rich and powerful that it could refuse business dealings with the Soviet Union, but it certainly was not going to go out of its political course to win its trade.

There are many points of view on this subject. Some are in favor of this view, some are in favor of that view, and some are in favor of a third view. The question is not whether there is a right or a wrong view, but whether there is a better view than the others. The answer to this question is that there is a better view than the others, and that is the view that there is no right or wrong view. This view is based on the fact that there are many points of view on this subject, and that each point of view is based on a different set of assumptions. Therefore, there is no right or wrong view, and the only way to determine which view is the best is to compare the views and see which one is the most reasonable.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to draw together the various aspects of the situation created by the refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet Union from 1917 through 1923. As previously stated, these years form a fruitful entity for study because they encompass a phase of United States-Russian relations which culminated in the largely static political relationship of 1923. The relative paucity of pages devoted to Russia in the Department of State's official Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States between 1923 and 1933 is sufficient proof of this fact. By the end of 1923, the attitude of the United States toward the recognition of the Soviet Union was well summed up by the blunt, even rude, reply of Secretary of State Hughes to Litvinov's letter to President Coolidge.<sup>1</sup> For good reason did the Soviet Foreign Office cease to bring up the topic in official conversation. It was left to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to initiate the review of contacts in 1933 which led to the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.

The summarization of the years from 1917 through 1923

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<sup>1</sup>See supra, p. 50.

The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. It was the first of the three main institutions of the European Union, alongside the European Council and the European Court of Justice. The CEC's primary role was to manage the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). It was responsible for implementing the policies of these communities and for proposing legislation to the Council of Ministers. The CEC also played a key role in the development of the common market, which was a central objective of the Treaty of Rome. It was responsible for ensuring the free movement of goods, services, and capital within the community. The CEC's work was carried out in a number of areas, including agriculture, transport, and research and development. It was also responsible for managing the European Development Fund, which provided financial assistance to the less developed regions of the community. The CEC's work was carried out in a number of areas, including agriculture, transport, and research and development. It was also responsible for managing the European Development Fund, which provided financial assistance to the less developed regions of the community.

falls naturally into two categories. First, there is the nature of the recognition problem--the principles involved and a comparison of the actions taken during the Democratic Administration of President Wilson and the Republican Administrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Second, there is the question of the soundness of the recognition policy followed during the time period. Was the American stand a wise one or should the United States have joined the general parade toward recognition of the Soviet Union by the major powers of the world during 1924 and 1925? The first category has been already covered in some depth; the second has not.

What, then, were the basic principles upon which recognition was refused to the Soviet Union? Did the United States abandon the traditional de facto policy of past years? Was the policy an extension of the one pursued toward Latin America, particularly Mexico?

One of the striking features of history is that, although some few men put their individual stamp upon its course, in retrospect, it is often discovered that a predictable pattern has evolved. Thus, Woodrow Wilson advanced a recognition policy based largely upon the personal moral conviction that he acted for the good of mankind. Yet, if a man of more traditional cast had been President of the United States, it is doubtful that the recognition policy of

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the United States towards the Soviet Union would have been substantially changed in 1923. By this, it is meant that President Wilson and Secretary of State Hughes each represented deep-seated concepts long ingrained in the American political composition. While they may have disagreed in specific interpretations of recognition policy, they both agreed to a basic policy which reflected their common heritage.

In this particular situation, it is somewhat superfluous to stress the legal aspects of recognition. Traditionally, in international law, no government is legally bound to recognize another. The need for diplomatic intercourse between nations, while a basic one and inherent to the nature of the system, is a policy over which each nation exercises discretion.

It is also a principle of international law that every state has a basic responsibility to respect the independence of other states and to refrain from acts deleterious to the safety and security of other states.<sup>2</sup> Both Wilson and Hughes accused the Soviet Union of not upholding a basic legal responsibility in this respect. Despite the weakly-reasoned, even ridiculous denials of the Soviet Union, it was obvious to all the world that the Soviet

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<sup>2</sup>Charles Cheyney Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1922), I, 84-85.



State, the Soviet Communist Party, and the Comintern were closely linked. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union stood legally at fault in this respect.

In a matter so political as recognition, it is nearly useless to attempt to rely upon legal analysis and legal approaches. While Woodrow Wilson initially refused to recognize Soviet Russia on the grounds of the doubtful stability of the U.S.S.R., such a stand became steadily less valid. Certainly by 1920, Wilson realized that the de facto requirement for recognition had been met by the Bolshevik regime. The Soviet Government was in effective control of the state. When Wilson immediately recognized the Provisional Government in March, 1917, he was acting for political reasons. For political reasons, he continued to fail to recognize Soviet Russia and so did the Republican Administrations of Harding and Coolidge.

Recognition for both President Wilson and Secretary of State Hughes was, then, a political weapon. They both desired to change the nature of the Soviet political control. Both had in common, as has been pointed out, a deep distaste for the world revolutionary nature of the Soviet regime. More specifically, however, Wilson based his primary charge against the Bolsheviks on the moral ground that they were a minority who had come to power by violence in the overthrow of a constitutional republican government. As



[illegible]



such, they did not represent the will of the people and, therefore, could not be recognized. Hughes took a more legalistic stance of stressing the failure of the Bolsheviks to live up to international obligations by repudiating debts. This is not to say that Wilson did not require that a nation fulfill its international responsibilities, for he did. Wilson was simply less ready to support American material interests than was Hughes.

Wilson objected to the unconstitutionality of the Soviet Government in that it did not represent the will of the people. Hughes, in a letter to Samuel Gompers, as has been mentioned, refused to accept such an approach. The will of the people could be demonstrated by "continued acquiescence" by the people in a government. As such, Hughes repudiated the Wilsonian approach. Still, there is reason to dispute Hughes's declared lack of interest in Russian internal affairs. One of the objectives stressed by Hughes was the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union. This would require a "fundamental change" in the Soviet governmental approach before recognition could be extended. Therefore, Hughes was in a practical sense very much interested in internal Soviet affairs, and for him to demand some change on economic grounds was perhaps less valid a reason both legally and morally than Wilson's unconstitutional approach by reason of minority rule.

best, they did not represent the will of the people and, therefore, could not be recognized. Japan took a more realistic course of attacking the claims of the minorities to live up to international obligations by recognizing them. This is not at all what Japan did and Japan was a nation which was international responsibilities, for as this, Japan was always ready to support certain national interests from the people.

Japan objected to the responsibility of the United Government in that it did not represent the will of the people. Japan, in a letter to United Nations, was very explicit, refused to accept such a position. The will of the people must be demonstrated by consultation and agreement by the people in a government. In fact, Japan rejected the minority approach. Well, there is reason to discuss Japan's demand for minority in terms of national rights. One of the objectives of Japan is to secure the economic rehabilitation of the people. Japan will create a "Ternamental country" in the United States. Japan's demand for recognition must be extended. Therefore, Japan was in a position to have been interested in Japanese minority affairs, and for this reason some things in Japanese history and Japanese law will be a reason for Japan and Japan's minority's national government by reason of minority law.

It has been shown that in some respects the recognition policy of Wilson, coming as it did between the Administrations of Taft and Harding was something of an anomaly. In the traditional use of the term de facto, Wilson broke with the policy of de facto recognition. He harked back to the policy of Seward--being even more positive than Seward in stressing constitutional procedure.

It is easy when speaking of a subject such as recognition to attempt to simplify it to the point where the original lessons of history can be lost. Such has been the case of de facto recognition. Thomas Jefferson is commonly given credit for the American practice of de facto recognition. Yet, what Jefferson intended by his recognitional principles was lost somewhat in a subsequent rush to simplify. Jefferson believed that if the "will of the people" was rightfully expressed, then the two chief aspects of recognition by American standards--stability and the capability to carry out international responsibilities--the latter encompassing the willingness to carry out responsibilities also--were by definition satisfied and recognition should be extended. The main point is that a government with the "will of the people" properly satisfies the de facto definition, but there is also the possibility of de facto requirements being met without the will of the people being properly expressed.



The fact that there is some respect for thought-  
 from today we witness, clearly as it has before the world-  
 freedom in 1917 and freedom was something of an anomaly.  
 In the treatment one of the best of today, it is not  
 after the point of the 1917 revolution, we cannot have to  
 the policy of today—only even more positive than today  
 in increasing emotional problems.  
 It is easy when speaking of a subject such as tempo-  
 rality to attempt to identify it to the point where the  
 highest terms of history can be found. But we have the  
 idea of the 1917 revolution. There is nothing is usually  
 given credit for the freedom given in the 1917 revolution.  
 Then, too, there is the freedom of the 1917 revolution.  
 Because the fact remains in a movement such as this,  
 freedom is not the will of the people, but  
 especially because, and the chief aspect of today-  
 time is not the freedom—freedom and the freedom to  
 only the movement of the 1917 revolution—the 1917 revolution  
 having the elements of today and the 1917 revolution  
 were by definition freedom and freedom would be the  
 world. The main point is that a movement such as this  
 in the world, freedom is not the 1917 revolution.  
 The fact is that the freedom of the 1917 revolution  
 today and freedom the will of the people is not freedom.  
 freedom.



The original meaning of de facto did not change, but the Jeffersonian idea of the "will of the people" often did. De facto, effective control, and the people's will make a very neat package, particularly if one is willing to accept expedient values. By way of example, one might note that Charles Evans Hughes spoke of the will of the people being expressed by "continued acquiescence."

All of this does not invalidate the theory of traditional American recognition policy and its Jeffersonian base. It does mean that the threads of "the will of the people" and de facto must be woven together with some circumspection. The writer suspects that Jefferson, as a practical politician, might well have agreed with Charles Evans Hughes as a matter of necessary political expediency. Finally, the position of Woodrow Wilson on recognition, while certainly not traditional de facto was perhaps closer to that of Thomas Jefferson than many others have been.

The recognition policy of Presidents Harding and Coolidge, as expressed by Secretary of State Hughes, marked a return to the general policy of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft. It clearly did not continue the Wilsonian theory since it stressed Soviet recalcitrance in fulfilling international obligations rather than consideration of Soviet constitutional character. In the sense that Hughes said that "stability" was essential, but was not everything, the



Republican approach to recognition was also clearly not a traditional de facto one.

To fit the recognition policy of the Harding and Coolidge Administrations into a particular niche is difficult. There was a high regard for material interests of American citizens but also a high regard for constitutional procedure at times which was reminiscent of Wilson's policy. For example, Wilson carried his Latin American policy over into the Russian policy. Hughes was consistent in that he utilized the same policy toward Russia that he had used toward Mexico. At the same time, Hughes approved in principle the 1923 Central-American treaty of peace and amity at Washington. Certainly, the Soviet Government did not meet the standards required for the approval of a revolutionary regime as contained in this treaty and which had in practice been applied in Central America since 1907. Yet, Hughes did not challenge Soviet Russia on any such grounds of constitutionality.

We must accept the Hughes's policy for what it appeared to be--a legalistic approach well suited to the tenor of the times. The mood of the American people during the 1920's was isolationist, conservative, and preoccupied with material interests. The debt position taken by Hughes toward Russia represented but a portion of a large picture of world debts owed to the United States. In the trade



negotiations between the two countries was also clearly not a

preliminary to the final one.

In the 1950s the policy of the United States

towards China was a continuation of the policy of 1945-

1949. There was a clear regard for the interests of

American citizens and also a high regard for the international

position of China which was recognized as a strategic policy.

The United States wanted the Latin American policy to be

more for American policy. There was a realization in 1945

that the new policy would have to be a new

policy. At the same time, the United States was in a

position to 1945. The United States was in a position to

negotiate. Certainly, the United States was not

the strongest support for the approval of a revolutionary

regime as compared to this policy and which had been

the main policy in Central America since 1945.

There was not a complete understanding of the new system in

the United States.

It was clear that the United States policy was not a

policy in the United States which was aimed at the United

of the United States. The United States was in a position

to 1945 and 1949. The United States was in a position

to 1945. The United States was in a position

to 1945. The United States was in a position

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issue, the United States was very careful to separate legality from trade.

Perhaps most important of all, there was, in the early 1920's, a very deep hostility toward Soviet Russia and Communism. This hostility had become a part of the public consciousness and was a legacy from the days of the "Red scare." This was a political fact which could not be ignored. The emotion was, in fact, shared by the leaders of America. Herbert Hoover was a prime example. Thus, behind the legal facade of an accusation of a failure to live up to international responsibilities lay a very deep antipathy for the Soviet Government and what it stood for. The principles of Communism were inimical to an American way of life and philosophy which was held almost sacred by American leaders. Hughes was voicing this outlook when he said, "Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country."<sup>3</sup> He could say this and mean it, despite the fact that actual Soviet propaganda efforts in the United States had been feeble and, certainly, no serious threat to the stability of the United States.

This brings us to the question of whether the policy of the United States was the right one. Should the United States have recognized the Soviet Union at an earlier date--

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<sup>3</sup>See supra, p. 50.

...the United States was very critical in regard to

policy from 1945.

During that period in 1945, there was in the

early 1940's, a very strong feeling among Soviet people and

Communists. The feeling was strong and it was in the early

1940's that we saw a change from the days of the 1930's

when this was a political party which could not be in-

cluded. The feeling was, in fact, expressed by the leaders of

the party. The feeling was that it was necessary to have a

the party leaders at an occasion in a factory in 1945 to go

to the factory and see the workers. It was a very deep feeling for

the party leaders and it was in that time that the feeling

of Communism was strong in the workers and in the

workers and it was in that time that the feeling of

the party was strong and it was in that time that the feeling

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for instance, in 1924 when most of the major nations of the world accorded recognition to the Soviets? As a background for considering such a question, it would help to keep in mind the results of final recognition in 1933. The recognition took place on November 16, 1933, in the form of a number of communications between Roosevelt and Litvinov. In addition to immediate recognition, there were agreements as follows: A mutual pledge to abstain from hostile propaganda; freedom of worship for American nationals in Russia; legal protection, on most-favored-nation terms, for American nationals, to be included in a consular convention; a waiving by the Soviet Government of all claims arising out of the American intervention in Siberia from 1918 to 1921. Further, there was an understanding that the matter of the Russian debt would be cleared up by the Soviets at the earliest opportunity.<sup>4</sup>

Following the recognition, it soon became apparent that the new era which had been hoped for between the United States and Soviet Russia was not going to live up to original rosy promises. Differences continued to plague relations. Once the Russians gained recognition, they refused seriously to consider the debt settlement. The same thing

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<sup>4</sup>See United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, 1933-1939 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952).



On January 1, 1977, the U.S. State Department announced that it had decided to suspend all U.S. military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese government. This decision was based on the fact that the South Vietnamese government had failed to meet its obligations under the U.S.-South Vietnam Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1955. The U.S. State Department stated that the South Vietnamese government had failed to provide adequate information regarding the activities of the South Vietnamese military and police forces, and that the South Vietnamese government had failed to provide adequate information regarding the activities of the South Vietnamese government. The U.S. State Department also stated that the South Vietnamese government had failed to provide adequate information regarding the activities of the South Vietnamese government.



had happened to Great Britain and France, but the United States chose not to include a debt settlement as a part of the original agreement. Whether a debt settlement could have been obtained at all is questionable, of course, but the passage by Congress of the Johnson Act on April 13, 1934, in which credit was refused to any nation which had defaulted on previous debts owed America, effectively served to inhibit trade despite a provision which exempted the Export-Import Bank from the Act.

In addition to the failure of trade to improve to any great extent, the old question of propaganda popped up again and again. Following speeches by American delegates at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on July 25, 1934, Ambassador to Russia Bullitt protested that the no-propaganda clause of the Washington Agreement had been violated. The Soviets replied, as previously, that they were not responsible for the Comintern. In effect, all of the quick results hoped for by the United States failed to materialize.

Was the American position, as it stabilized in 1923, a good one? First off, it is necessary to dispel some illusions. There is a school of thought which would advance out of hand the reasoning that the United States should have recognized in the 1920's. This is an approach which is ever quick to criticize the men and methods of the past. The

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problems of the world were not solved in the past, ergo the approach in the past was wrong.

This type of reasoning can very often be misleading because it is based upon judgment out of context. There were very good reasons both for and against recognizing the Soviet Union in the 1920's, and they must be understood if the lessons of history are to have real value for the present and the future.

The United States should have recognized the Soviet Union earlier. Such early recognition would ideally have been conditioned by an awareness of the political realities of the problem. That is, it would have been futile from the first to hope for immediate advantages in a situation keyed to the "long haul."

The position of the United States was unrealistic in several respects. In the matter of debts, it soon became obvious that anything short of substantial credit advancements would not alter the Soviet position. Further, in view of the fact that America's share of Russia's war debt was only 7 per cent compared to the 70 per cent of Great Britain and the nearly 20 per cent of France, any settlement with the United States would have had repercussions in Europe. From Rapallo on, Russia had managed to secure an uneasy peace in this quarter. Even the most obtuse statesmen of the period must have grown weary of the protracted and







sterile wranglings over the matter of debts and reparations. In the long run, Soviet Russia obtained from Europe the trade and recognition she desired without sacrificing her position on debts, but at a great sacrifice in the failure to obtain long-term credits.

There can be no doubt that the policy of nonrecognition built a mutual wall of ignorance and intolerance between the United States and Russia and thus fanned the embers of a psychology of hostility which still exists. A premium was placed upon finding points of disagreement rather than any area of mutual agreement which could lend to an abatement of antagonistic emotions.

The admitted purpose of nonrecognition was to force a change in the Soviet position. The supercharged emotions of anti-Communism, however, caused a perceptible lag in the American public awareness that a revolution had occurred in Russia which had achieved a good degree of permanency and which must be treated on such a basis. This lack of awareness of reality by the American public and American statesmen is a serious charge which is often leveled by critics. That is, the American position too easily becomes dogmatic and rigid and thus incapable of flexibility and expedient movements when an original situation changes.

In carrying out a policy of nonrecognition, American statesmen, then, hoped to force or "coerce" a change in the

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Soviet approach. The United States has been able to make and unmake governments in certain areas of the world (such as Latin America), but the position of the Soviet Union was not comparable to a Latin American country. Coercion by use of recognition will work as long as power considerations are favorable. Even considering the basic weakness of the Bolsheviks, the past and potential power positions of Russia should have served to warn against such tactics, especially when America's former Allies refused to join in any concerted effort.

There is basis for a charge that the whole of the American approach was based on a concept of the Russians as underdogs. The Russian desire to be treated as equals was broadly overlooked. In fact, the Bolsheviks insisted upon it from the beginning. This is why, in 1922, when the United States sounded out Russia to ascertain if a United States Technical Commission would be welcome to study economic conditions in the U.S.S.R., the Russians replied that they were willing provided they were allowed the same privileges in the United States. This point of equality was a diplomatic nicety which the United States seemed to insist upon bungling.

In defense of the American position, it is patently unfair to judge men and their actions out of the context of their times. The American statesmen who guided the destiny







of the United States during the period in question were, on the whole, a dedicated and intelligent group whose loyalty was unquestioned. They were men of prudent judgment who liked to act on the basis of facts. It is often overlooked that reliable intelligence was often lacking to the statesmen of that period. Limited and discreet moves were almost a necessity if serious blunders were to be avoided--especially in a situation so obscure as the Russian one. It is quite understandable that Charles Evans Hughes would fail to see any practical advantages to be gained by recognition. He could see, for instance, that once the United States recognized Soviet Russia it also recognized Soviet Russian laws regarding nationalization and appropriation of private property. Living in another generation, it is easy to lose sight of the problems of another. The American statesmen of the 1920's fully believed, and with good reason, that they were acting for the good of the nation in not recognizing the Soviet Union.

Why then should the United States have recognized Russia earlier? This involves the judgments of George Kennan which were advanced in the introductory chapter of this paper (supra, pp. 3-4). It has been shown that American diplomacy in the 1920's sought to provide a predominantly legalistic basis for recognition in substitution for

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Wilson's predominantly moral one. The Republicans believed in their stand, and they also realized how unconvincing it was in a cynical world of national and self-interest to stand on moral principle primarily. Yet, they did not perceive the potentially-disastrous effects of what Kennan calls the "legalistic-moralistic" approach.

The belief that in the international field it should be possible to gain acceptance for some system of legal and moral rules which will bring order out of chaos may be a wonderful dream. In the realm of practical international politics, it is a pernicious hoax. It is so because there is no judicial entity which is capable, or has the power, of making the necessary judgments for states. The states, themselves, jealously refuse to give up this sovereignty.

By causing its believers often to ignore the true nature and international significance of international political problems, the legalistic/moralistic approach takes away from the political actor the skill and will needed to act. The setting of the 1920's made the selection of this approach the expedient one, but this does not make it right. An argument as to whether international politics is moral or legalistic or both is really beside the point. The "legalistic-moralistic" approach leads to inaction. It gilds the status quo. Politics based upon truly enlightened



...the fact that the political system is not a simple one. It is a complex one. It is a system of power and influence. It is a system of interests and conflicts. It is a system of ideas and values. It is a system of institutions and processes. It is a system of people and their actions. It is a system of change and continuity. It is a system of order and disorder. It is a system of justice and injustice. It is a system of life and death. It is a system of hope and despair. It is a system of love and hate. It is a system of peace and war. It is a system of freedom and slavery. It is a system of truth and lies. It is a system of good and evil. It is a system of light and darkness. It is a system of life and death. It is a system of hope and despair. It is a system of love and hate. It is a system of peace and war. It is a system of freedom and slavery. It is a system of truth and lies. It is a system of good and evil. It is a system of light and darkness.



national interests may be many things, but it is not quiescent. As Kennan states:

History has shown that the will and the capacity of individual peoples to contribute to their world environment is constantly changing. . . . The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit this process of change by imposing a legal straight jacket upon it but rather to facilitate it, to ease its transitions, to temper the asperities to which it often leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international life in general. But this is a task for diplomacy . . . .<sup>5</sup>

Our policy of nonrecognition of Soviet Russia was mistaken in its long continuance in the 1920's. American diplomacy became rigid and inflexible on the question of recognition of the Soviet Union and, thereby, sacrificed the function for which, by definition, it existed. The United States should have recognized the Soviet Union in the 1920's and was long overdue when it finally recognized in 1933. Our schoolboy disappointments over the results in 1933 were indicative of how little we really understood the problem and of how similar the prejudgments of 1933 were to those of 1923. The need is for the American people and their political leaders to arrive at an increased political sensitivity which will enable them to separate supposition from reality and to translate reality into concrete terms of positive political action on the world scene.

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<sup>5</sup>George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 85.



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






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